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INTRODUCTION

“The impact of personal status laws cannot be underestimated in regards to women,
work, and participation in public life, the economy, or political system. As a totality,
personal status laws confine women within predetermined patriarchal parameters, and
give them only limited freedom of choice outside parental and husband approval.”
—Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, Women of Jordan: Islam, Labor, & the Law, 183.

“Water quenches thirst and purifies, and shari’a is running water; it is also the road
leading to the watering-place.”
—Bernard Botiveau, Al-Shari’a al-islamiyya wal-qanun fil-mujtama’at al-‘arabiyya, 59.
Translated by Fuad al-Dahhan. Cairo: Sina lil-Nashr, 1997.

5

Introduction
Personal status law is the set of laws that govern a person’s marriage, divorce, and
custody. It is significant because it is part of a long-term framework that has defined
women’s rights for centuries. In this thesis, I will argue that personal status code is a
patriarchal framework that has been reinforced over time. As such, this is the
“institution” of personal status that will be traced. In this thesis I will argue that personal
status has undergone a critical juncture, or crucial moment of potential to change, in both
Jordan and Iraq’s founding, and that this has consequentially affected personal status law
throughout the 20th century.
First, I will explain the term patriarchy and the theory of historical
institutionalism. Then, I will start at the beginning: before Islam. It is important to
understand how the “norm” came to be before suggesting that it has changed at a certain
point in time. This will include the pre-Islam era, Islam and the Qur’an, and the Ottoman
Empire, briefly. Next, I will review the history of Jordan and then Iraq and identify the
critical juncture of personal status. In each chapter I will also explore the matter of de
facto, or what women’s rights are like in practice. Then, I will briefly make my
conclusion on the development of personal status.
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THEORY
Introduction
Two theories are used as the lenses of this analysis of personal status law: (1)
patriarchy as a “matrix of power,” and (2) historical institutionalism. Patriarchal systems
are intertwined with other hierarchies to reinforce each other or compete. Historical
institutionalism, rather than assuming a rigid and static nature of a given organization,
approaches institutions as dynamic entities, with multiple groups participating in its path
formation. A critical juncture, or an especially fluid moment in the nature of the
institution during a relatively short period of time, will be defined in this analysis of
personal status law. The objective of this thesis is to identify critical junctures and
examine in what contexts personal status law is apt to change.
Defining Patriarchy
Patriarchy is a particular power arrangement that uses gender as an organizing
feature. As Gwen Hunnicutt explains, citing Blumberg’s theory of gender stratification:
There are patriarchal systems at the macro level (bureaucracies, government,
law, market, religion), and there are patriarchal relations at the micro level
interactions, families, organizations, patterned behavior between intimates). A
family or an academic department might be characterized as patriarchal in
structural terms, or an individual might hold patriarchal views. Micro- and
macro-patriarchal systems exist symbiotically.1
It is common for patriarchal systems to embrace contradictory values of
valorizing male aggressiveness and disdaining violence against women; being female in a
patriarchal society is both a risk factor and a protective factor. A woman’s experience in

1

Rae Lesser Blumberg, “A general theory of gender stratification,” Sociological Theory, 2 (1984): 23-101,
in Gwen Hunnicutt, “Varieties of Patriarchy and Violence Against Women: Resurrecting ‘Patriarchy’ as a
Theoretical Tool,” Violence Against Women, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May 2009): 557.
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such a society is that of both protection and harm from men. Hunnicutt explains the
paradox of protection:
Chivalry renders women powerless because accepting protection implies
neediness and vulnerability; meanwhile, the threat of being victimized requires
acquiescence to the protection men offer. Under patriarchal systems, women are
subject to varying amounts of risk and protection… Women who ‘violate’ the
normative standards of male behavior may no longer benefit from the ‘privilege’
of male protection. Thus, the victimization of women is bound up with a protective
element in patriarchal relations.2
Fatima Mernissi articulates the ‘tragedy of the patriarchal male’ in the context of
virginity:
…That is the great tragedy of the patriarchal male: his status lies in irrational
schizophrenic contradictions, and is vested in a being whom he has defined from
the start as the enemy: woman and her subterranean silence, woman who engulfs
him in a sea of lies and in swamps of sordid manipulation. The law of retaliation:
an eye for an eye, a lie for a lie… The vicious circle of an impossible dialogue
between partners mutilated by an insane patriarchy.3
In a patriarchal scheme of societal power, the individual behavior of men is
conditioned and determined by pre-existing hegemonic social structures that are dynamic
and contested.4,

5

The organized hegemony between men and women needs only

“ideological domination… through a symbolic climate that engineers consent and

2

Gwen Hunnicutt, “Varieties of Patriarchy and Violence Against Women: Resurrecting ‘Patriarchy’ as a
Theoretical Tool,” Violence Against Women, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May 2009): 565-566, doi:
10.1177/1077801208331246
3

Fatima Mernissi, “Virginity and Patriarchy,” Lamalif, No. 107, June/July 1979, in Women’s Studies
International Forum, 1982, Vol 5, No. 2, 185, doi:10.1016/0277-5395(82)90026-7.
4

Stephan Fuchs, “Beyond agency,” Sociological Theory, March 2001 (Vol. 19, Issue 1: 25-40), in Gwen
Hunnicutt, “Varieties of Patriarchy and Violence Against Women: Resurrecting ‘Patriarchy’ as a
Theoretical Tool,” Violence Against Women, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May 2009): 560
5

Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Cambridge, UK: Polity (2000), in Gwen Hunnicutt, “Varieties of
Patriarchy and Violence Against Women: Resurrecting ‘Patriarchy’ as a Theoretical Tool,” Violence
Against Women, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May 2009): 559.
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docility.”6 The existence of a patriarchal hierarchy can be as natural to a society as
breathing air, and its dynamic and contested nature may be masked as other phenomenon.
The family, central to personal status law, is a societal structure that supports
other systems of patriarchy. Religions and nation-states have integrated such hierarchies
with the gender hierarchy of the family to monopolize power among various male
authority figures, from the father to the king of a nation.7 The patriarchal hierarchy is not
a neat alliance among men. Patriarchies are characterized by the dual role of the
individual in ensuring its survival. Individuals in a hierarchical system are both oppressed
and the oppressor;8 a husband might abuse his wife but be oppressed by a local authority
but both of their roles in society are part of a framework of power partially based on
gender. However, a patriarchal society can incorporate multiple hierarchies of power,
including those created by the state. Laws and other state mechanisms may attempt to
discipline males but result in the reproduction of paternalism and a general system of
domination in response to external pressure.9 Laws may also, of course, reinforce an
alignment of patriarchies among several society institutions.

6

Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the prison notebooks. London: Lawrence and Wishart (1972), in Gwen
Hunnicutt, “Varieties of Patriarchy and Violence Against Women: Resurrecting ‘Patriarchy’ as a
Theoretical Tool,” Violence Against Women, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May 2009): 561.
7

Gwen Hunnicutt, “Varieties of Patriarchy and Violence Against Women: Resurrecting ‘Patriarchy’ as a
Theoretical Tool,” Violence Against Women, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May 2009): 563.
8

Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of
empowerment, (New York: Routledge, 1991), 225 in Gwen Hunnicutt, “Varieties of Patriarchy and
Violence Against Women: Resurrecting ‘Patriarchy’ as a Theoretical Tool,” Violence Against Women, Vol.
15, No. 5 (May 2009): 564.
9

Gwen Hunnicutt, “Varieties of Patriarchy and Violence Against Women: Resurrecting ‘Patriarchy’ as a
Theoretical Tool,” Violence Against Women, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May 2009): 568.
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Historical Institutionalism
When examining the laws of the state, it is important to analyze the institution the
laws are borne from and ultimately their context. There are three different varieties of
institutionalism theory: rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and
sociological institutionalism. For the purposes of this analysis, the theory of historical
institutionalism will be used to trace the political development in Jordan and Iraq and
point to the critical juncture within each state that has defined personal status law in each
country. The goal in institutionalism theory is “to test theoretical propositions against
observed phenomena, in order not only to explain the cases at hand but also to refine the
theory.”10 In line with the tradition of historical institutionalism, my analysis begins with
the “empirical puzzle” of the discrepancy between each state’s claim to safeguarding
women’s rights and their subversion. The two nation-states of Jordan and Iraq expressed
similar views on shari’a law. All countries have issues with de jure versus de facto (in
law versus in practice), especially judicial oversight. While the specifics of personal
status law in each country may not differ dramatically, the history and politics the laws
are borne from have created different path dependencies from the original institution of
personal status under, the Ottoman Family Code, in the Ottoman Empire (1299AD1923AD).
A core claim of historical institutionalism is that institutions are more than
channels for policy and political conflict but are institutionalized interests and

10

Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review Political Science,
Vol. 2, (1999), 373, doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.369.
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objectives.11 This study of personal status law will demonstrate that at the critical
juncture of each state, the politics of the moment dictates the relationship between shari’a
law and a given state, thus also affecting personal status law and women’s rights. In
contrast, rational choice theory embraces a functional view of institutions12 as
mechanisms for reducing transaction costs and achieving victories in an anarchic world.13
This theory assumes the stability of the institution and does not create analytical space to
explain institutional change.
This critical examination recognizes an overlap between rational choice and
historical institutionalism theory; the ‘rational’ dynamics of individual behavior affect the
result of the institution, in this case, the judiciary.14 Bates and his colleagues15 explain
that rational choice theory provides “tools for studying political outcomes in stable
institutional settings” but “political transitions seem to defy rational forms of analysis.”16
The emergence of a national personal status law (or lack thereof) can “bring questions of
timing and temporality in politics [rather than equilibrium order] to the center of the
11

John Zysman. “How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth,” Industrial and
Corporate Change, Vol. 3, No. 1, (1994), 243, in Ibid, 375.

12

Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,”
Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 (1996): 943-44, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.

13

Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, “Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice.” Public
Choice, 37 (1981):503-19; Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Institutional equilibrium and equilibrium institutions.”
Political Science: The Science of Politics, ed. H Weisberg, (1986): 5181; Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences
and power in the European community,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, (2008):473524, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.
14

John Zysman. “How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth,” Industrial and
Corporate Change, Vol. 3, No. 1, (1994): 277.
15

Robert H. Bates, Rui J.P. de Figueiredo Jr., Barry R. Weingast, “The Politics of Interpretation:
Rationality, Culture, and Transition,” Politics and Society, Vol. 26, Issue 4 (December 1998): 603-638.
16

Ibid, 604-605.
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analysis of how institutions matter.”17 Rules, policy structures, and norms are imbedded
in the history of institutions.18 In Jordan and Iraq the institution of personal status law
under shari’a law has remained a legal sacred space, so to speak. Shari’a law is its own
institution but with the rise of the nation-state, free from British mandate control, there
came a critical juncture as to how to incorporate or distinguish the religious law and state
law. As Orren & Skowronek state “[T]he various institutional arrangements that make up
a policy emerge at different times and out of different historical configurations. For this
reason, the various ‘pieces’ [may] not necessarily fit together into a coherent, selfreinforcing, let alone functional, whole.”19 A synchronized, functional machine of state
laws would serve rational choice institutionalism theory well. In the case of Jordan and
Iraq, however, their governments emerged haphazardly and in a fit of political fury (i.e.
Arab Nationalism). Regional wars and political contests have also made the development
of these states challenging in the chaos of many political interests. Personal status law
and women’s rights are used to bolster the authority and power of the state as it serves
their purpose. The critical juncture examined in each state is related to Arab Nationalism,
whether it is to subdue or harness its consequences. A politically tumultuous time in the
creation of an independent state is an opportune moment to change the adjudication of
personal status law because shifting the gravity from shari’a courts to state courts would
be a natural shift in power. To codify personal status law as a state law is to change the
17

Karen Orren and Steven Skowronek, “Beyond the iconography of order: notes for a ‘new’
institutionalism,” in Dodd L. and Jillson C., eds., The Dynamics of American Politics (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1988): 312.
18

Paul Pierson “The path to European integration: a historical institutionalist approach.” Comparative
Political Studies. Vol. 29, No. 2 (1996):126.
19

Kathleen Thelen, 382.
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vehicle in which rules of marriage and the family unit are defined and contested, and thus
the ultimate authority in such affairs.
In Stark & Bruszt’s work on Eastern Europe, they argue “social change [is not] a
transition from one order to another but…a transformation—rearrangements,
reconfigurations, and recombinations that yield new interweavings of the multiple social
logics…”20 Orren & Skowronek also find “many [transitions] occurring in different
domains—political, economic, and social—and the temporality of these processes is
often asynchronous and their articulation seldom harmonious.”21 Institutions are formed
as a bricolage, “an innovative process whereby new institutions differ from but resemble
old ones.”22 Politics is a dynamic process that can produce unintended consequences as
seemingly separate processes interact in the civic sphere. The interdisciplinary nature of
institutional development and the overlay of several power matrices of society will be
considered in this study of personal status law development in Jordan and Iraq.
To address the third main school of institutionalism: sociological institutionalism
suggests that institutions are “shared scripts,” which obscures conflict and
overemphasizes continuity in the same “cultural template.”23 Dominant cultural norms
are borne from concrete political conflicts, with political groups fighting over which

20

Orren and Skowronek, 7.

21

David Stark & Laszlo Bruszt, Postoscialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East
Central Europe, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 81.

22

John L. Campbell, “Mechanisms of evolutionary change in economic governance: interaction,
interpretation and bricolage,” in Evolutionary Economics and Path Dependence, ed. L. Magnusson, J
Ottosson, (Cheltenham, UK: Elgar, 1997), 22, ISBN 1858982138.
23

Kathleen Thelen, 387.
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norms will prevail.24 The idea of a shared script in sociological institutionalism ignores,
in this analysis, the shifting dominant policy paradigms25 often imposed by powerful
actors26 that use legitimacy, not automaticity, to ensure that the scripts are followed.27 It
also fails to consider the bricolage and consolidation of cultures that can occur. When
considering questions of institutionalization of personal status law, the politics and
authority spearheading political development, rather than the cognitive culture, remains
the more significant context.28
Critical junctures are “crucial founding moments of institutional formation that
send countries along broadly different developmental paths.”29 The developmental
pathways are “constrained by past trajectories” but allow for institutional development in
response to changing environmental conditions and political change.”30 Macro-historical
analyses of critical junctures are the basis of historical institutionalism, seeing
“institutions as enduring legacies of political struggles.”31One major critical juncture: the
creation of the Ottoman mejelle is shared between Iraq and Jordan. In this analysis we
will explore the critical juncture of the tumultuous entrance into nation-hood.
24

Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan,
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1996), 307. doi: 10.2307/2658797.
25

Peter A. Hall, “Policy paradigms, social learning and the state.” Comparative Politics. 23 (1993):275-96.

26

Kathleen Thelen, 387.

27

Arthur L. Stinchcombe, “On the virtues of the old institutionalism,” Annual Review Society, 23 (1997):118, doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.1.
28

Kathleen Thelen, 387.

29

Ibid.

30

Ibid.

31

Kathleen Thelen, 388.
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In Ertman’s Birth of the Leviathan, he found that between the 12th and 18th
century in Europe:
Where state-builders faced geopolitical competition early, they were forced into
greater concessions to the financiers, merchants, and administrators who
financed and staffed the bureaucracy, resulting in patrimonial systems. Where
rules confronted geopolitical pressures later, ‘they found themselves in a quite
different world,’ where developments in education and finance made these side
payments unnecessary, resulting in greater bureaucratic autonomy. 32
Ertman’s analysis of geopolitical competition in state-building broadly
demonstrates how third variable factors can affect institutions. This study of judicial
institutional development includes the individuals or political groups invested in a
particular judicial arrangement, how or whether that vision remains over time, and how
those who are not invested in the institutions keep others out of the realm of influence.33
The patriarchal framework of personal status law, for example, can keep women out of
the realm of influence by excluding them from Islamic jurisprudence and touting the
separate realms for men and women as justification for the paradox of protection. The
political players of a governmental or civil institution can determine an institutional
legacy’s duration. When political groups encounter critical junctures, they have the
potential to produce more stable regimes, solidifying control and the stability of the
institutional structure, or they may plant “seeds of their own destruction.”34 A decision at
the point of critical juncture may essentially make or break the institution in question.
Over a significant period of time, these considerations may become crucial to
32

Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern
Europe, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997), 28, ISBN-10: 0521484278.
33

Kathleen Thelen, 391.

34

Kathleen Thelen, 400.
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understanding exactly what kinds of events have undermined an institutional legacy.35
Urgent political choices have the potential for long-standing institutional impact. It is also
important to consider the set of mechanisms that incentivize and coordinate a set of
desired effects for political leaders. Political players “adapt their strategies in ways that
reflect [and] also reinforce the ‘logic’ of the system.”36 Thelen, basing her research on
Ikenberry (1994) and Pierson (1997) emphasizes that “institutions are not neutral
coordinating mechanisms but in fact reflect, and also reproduce and magnify, particular
patterns of power distribution in politics” because “political arrangements and policy
feedbacks actively facilitate the organization and empowerment of certain groups while
actively disarticulating and marginalizing others.”37 In the case of personal status law, the
contesting groups are those who wish to see shari’a courts adjudicating personal status
law and those who wish to see civil courts adjudicating. At stake is a long-standing
patriarchal power matrix of marriage and the family.
Historical institutionalism expands the scope of analysis beyond internal
development and also considers how organizations originally came to be and how that
then continues to influence understanding of and the pursuit of interests. This analysis of
historical instituionalism will consider the origin of the institution of religious law. A
‘we’ needs to be established before its interests can be articulated,38 and various groups

35

Kathleen Thelen, 392.

36

Kathleen Thelen, 392-393.

37

Kathleen Thelen, 394.

38

Hall PA. 1993. Policy paradigms, social learning and the state. Comparative Politics. 23.
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should recognize common interests and construct political alliances.39 The incentives in
political-economic institutions are a “reflection and product of power relations,”40 which
in this analysis is the institution of personal status law.
As mentioned before, historical institutionalism is especially useful when
analyzing change in an institution. Disruptions in the feedback mechanisms that
previously reproduced stable patterns, create political openings for institutional evolution
and development.41 For example:
Changes in gender relations an family structures are likely to reinforce elements
of the universalistic and liberal welfare states (which both, though in different
ways, support a high level of labor-force participation by women), but these
changes create new friction and contradictions for conservative welfare states,
which are premised on the single-breadwinner model of the family.42
The different mechanisms that define a liberal welfare state and a conservative welfare
state, influence how the social change in gender relations would have such different
results. These mechanisms have the potential to determine whether social change in one
domestic context will “[disrupt] previously stable patterns in some countries while
washing over others seemingly without effect.”43 Political and economic contexts matter
when analyzing a legal institution.
The following investigation of the development of personal status law will seek to
define the critical junctures as the political moments when Iraq and Jordan changed or

39

Kathleen Thelen, 394-395.

40

Kathleen Thelen, 395.

41

Kathleen Thelen, 397.

42

Ibid.

43

Kathleen Thelen, 298.
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could have changed personal status law and its relationship to the state. The questions of
stability and development rest on the escalation from an originally stable pathway
development into critical junctures of change –even for a short period of history.44
Critical junctures are, in a way, a chance to deviate from the norm or maintain a straight
path. When analyzing personal status, it is important to define the ‘norm.’ Personal status
law under the Ottoman Empire in this case is considered the ‘norm’ as the states of
Jordan and Iraq become independent nation-states.
Paul Pierson, author of Politics in Time, wrote: “Junctures are ‘critical’ because
they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very
difficult to alter.”45 According to Collier and Collier’s analysis of political development
in eight Latin American countries, a critical juncture is “a period of significant change,
which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or other units of analysis)
and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies."46 Mahoney and other historical
institutionalists emphasize the connection between critical junctures and path
dependency. It is difficult to change in relation to the critical juncture, when multiple
alternatives were still available.47 Critical junctures in institution-building depend on
actors who are willing to shape outcomes in “a more voluntaristic fashion than normal

44

Orren & Skowronek, 329-30.

45

Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004), 135, ISBN-10: 0691117152.
46

Kathleen Thelen, 389.

47

James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society, 29 (August 2000),
513; and Mahoney “Path Dependent Explanations of Regime Change,” Studies in Comparative and
International Development, Vol. 36, No. 1, (2001), 113.
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circumstances permit...”48 A critical juncture occurs when the relationship between
structural influences and political action are significantly more relaxed for a relatively
short period of time, increasing the range of plausible options open to powerful political
actors and augmenting the consequences of their decisions.49 Change is not a necessary
element of a critical juncture. Agents of the critical juncture must face a broader range of
feasible options than normal because they are part of a moment that is “qualitatively
different from the ‘normal’ historical development of the institutional setting of
interest.”50 They need not always change institution at the point of a critical juncture.
Consequentially, political upheaval may not affect the institution in question.51
The time horizon of the critical juncture must also be short in relation to the subsequent
path dependency.52 A possible result of a critical juncture is the renewal of the “precritical juncture status quo.”53 Critical junctures in political science focus on decisions by
influential actors—political leaders, policymakers, bureaucrats, judges—and examine
how during a phase of institutional fluidity they steer outcomes toward a new
equilibrium.54 In this theory-guided narrative, I will examine the main political actors,
their goals, and the events that directly influenced them and their decision to remove

48

Mahoney, 7

49

Giovanni Capoccia & Daniel R. Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics, Vol 59, No. 3, (April 2007), 343.

50

Ibid, 348.

51

Ibid, 349.

52

Ibid, 351.

53

Ibid, 352.

54

Ibid, 354.
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personal status law from a system under shari’a courts to a national-legal court –or not. I
will attempt to define what makes the critical junctures “critical” and explain the
consequences of the choice made in the adjudication of personal status law.55 The goal of
this thesis is to add dimension to the understanding of women’s rights, at a legal and
historical level, in both Jordan and Iraq.

55

Giovanni Capoccia & Daniel R. Kelemen, 357.

20

BEFORE NATION-STATES
Introduction
To begin examining the historical context of personal status law, an Islamic code
on the rules of marriage, this thesis will introduce the moment before nationhood for both
Jordan and Iraq. Concepts of hierarchical power will have particular emphasis. This
background will make a more complete analysis of personal status law, and the
‘bricolage’ that constitutes its institution.
Jahiliyyah
Jahiliyyah, a word coming from ‘jahl’ or the Arabic root for ignorance, refers to
the age of ignorance in the pre-Islamic Arab peninsula. In the northern part of the
peninsula, people built shrines for goddesses, part of a hierarchy topped by one major
God. It is wrong to conclude that the time of Jahiliyyah was entirely matriarchal or
patriarchal. The fact that there were goddesses and women with complete selfdetermination in sexual and socio-political matters indicate competing matrices of
cultural power. Historians theorize that, in the time of Jahiliyyah, there were emerging
patriarchal societies among the Byzantine and Persians who traded with the Arab
society.56
Azizah al-Hibri suspects that surrounding societies traded weapons only with men
because of their own patriarchal practices and the numerous legends warning of Arab
women warriors fighting off attacking tribes and empires with the posts of their tents.
56

Azizah al-Hibri, “A Study of Islamic Herstory: Or How Did We Ever Get Into This Mess?” Women’s
Studies International Forum, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1982): 210.
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This preference for trade with men was bound to affect the Arab tribal lifestyle. Al-Hibri
argues that, in conjunction with the emerging power structure, in pre-Islamic Jahiliyyah
times the Islamic system was “based on the assumption that the woman is a powerful and
dangerous being.”57
In Jahiliyyah, men owned women in marriage, and those women were passed
down to the son. A man could marry up to 100 women. The son could inherit his father’s
wives and marry any of them, except his mother, sell their property or sell them to
another male for dowry in the payment of camels or horses. Women inherited nothing
and what they did have was under the husband’s control.58 The patriarchal order relied on
patrilineage, where the father is the absolute ruler of the family with wives and children
he could sell, kill or incarcerate. If the son is honorable, he inherits his father’s societal
power. The tribal men became the political, economic, military and legal authorities for
the whole society, and the ‘paternal bond’ was sacred.59 Male relationships were crucial
to societal stability and their power relied on ownership of women.
The northern Arabs practiced female infanticide likely because of poverty and
fear of shame.60 Other Arab tribes might capture daughters and enslave them, making
earlier marriages void, and the victors free to have sexual relations with them until they
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became free through a compromise and trade.61 The Tamim, Rabi’ah and Kindah were
tribes famous for killing their daughter for fear of shame and betrayal. In a story about
the daughter of Qais Bin ‘Assem, a leader of the tribe of Tamim, she is captured by the
soldiers of the Nu’man Bin al-Munther tribe but when she has a opportunity to return to
her husband, she chose to stay with her captor and renounced her tribe by doing so. Tribal
leader Qais Bin ‘Assem killed every female infant born to him after the incident. A
similar story is told about the Rabi’ah tribe.62 By the century leading up to Islam, many
Arab fathers discovered that selling their daughters for a dowry was more profitable than
burying them in the ground.63 The economics of tribal society influenced how they
perceived the value of women.64
Islam provided an alternative and compelling narrative for human society and in a
way that overlapped, replaced, and competed with the former ‘paternal bond’ at the
center of Jahiliyyah. Islam promised that any person, no matter their color, wealth, or
gender, could be equal before Allah, the highest authority of all. With the emergence of
Islam, tribal allegiances were consequentially weakened, and people allied with each
other on moral and religious principles. Islam ostensibly replaced the past hierarchy. The
Prophet also stressed the significance of family without demoting women to the status of
property. When a son asked whom he should honor and befriend the most, the Prophet
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answered: ‘Your mother, then your mother, then your mother, then your father.’65 The
Prophet promised paradise to men that lived in accordance to Islam. However, Islam
could not completely unseat tribal patriarchy if it were to survive. A flexible ideology
was needed in order for Islam to survive past the Prophet’s death. After the Prophet’s
death, the ulema, or religious authorities, created Islam’s flexibility and adaptability to
social and historical change.66
The ‘paternal bond’ among tribal societies was strong and had provided the Arab
society with a set of customs that enabled it to survive. After the death of the Prophet
Muhammad (632 AD), the Arab ‘al-Murtaddeen,’ from the root murtad (apostate), sought
to return to the old ways. The Muslim military crushed them, but it is likely that the
patriarchal tribal societies incorporated its practices into Islam. For example, not long
after the Prophet’s death, the Caliphate Omar Ibn el-Khattab (r. 634-44 AD) tried to
decrease the dowry to a symbolic sum. Men saw women as capable and dangerous beings
in the patriarchy of this time. It was only with the rise of Western ideology that the it
incorporated the idea of inherent inferiority.67 The patriarchal matrix of Islam
incorporated some tribal customs as the tribes adopted the new ideology and sought to
live the life their Prophet.
Islamic Jurisprudence
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The family laws established in Islam and applied in Muslim countries today were
founded in medieval Islamic jurisprudence. The scholars based this jurisprudence on
religious and cultural reasoning and the patriarchal reasoning for organizing society is
“not historically an isolated event.” As stated before, the patriarchal tribes were “greatly
influenced in its development by the neighboring Byzantine and Persian empires.”68
Establishing a patriarchal society was a way of remaining competitive with other
neighboring cultures. Medieval Islamic analysis of religious texts following the Prophet’s
death, however, established the conflation between religious principles and patriarchal
practice. The Qur’an and the Sunnah (hadith, or collections of stories and teaching of the
Prophet, and example of the Prophet) are the foundations for Islamic Law. Muslim
Scholars who utilized ijtihad, or the science of interpretation and rule-making based on
linguistic and religious knowledge were called the mujtahids. Before political authority
integrated Islam, they did not need to fear retribution if they were wrong, even from their
God. So long as they piously sought the correct answer, mujtahids could interpret Islam’s
religious sources with only the governing force of their mental faculty.69 Early jurists
viewed disagreements as a sign of God’s mercy.70
Individual Muslims who were not mujtahids could select the school of
jurisprudence they preferred. Every Muslim would have to account personally to God for
his or her choices. Hundreds of schools of ijtihad developed for their respective
68
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communities. Ijtihad, even if it was critically employed, remained affected by the judge’s
history of patriarchal values and disapproval of women in public life.71 Furthermore, the
freedom to develop so many schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence gave
communities autonomy in their legal and personal status affairs. Personal status at this
time was not codified into a central set of laws.
Under authoritarian and patriarchal political authorities scholars did not have the
freedom of ijtihad. Political authorities punished dissident mujtahids for exercising their
critical thinking on politically significant matters. For example Imam Malik Ibn Anas
was tortured for exercising critical thought on political contractual matters.72 Women
were gradually removed from religious leadership at this time. Some rulers preferred
certain schools of thought, and it became easiest to have a streamlined and clear system
of rules. The Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali and Ja’fari schools of jurisprudence
emerged in response to the political demand of a centralized and controlled code.73 Not
all schools were founded at the same time and many were founded because a mujtahid
disagreed with another mujtahid. And “as the State grew more powerful, [choices of the
preferred Islamic justice system] were increasingly taken out of the hands of
individuals”74 and made streamlined. The first completed school of jurisprudence was
developed under Sultan Salim, I of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century.
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Codification of Islamic law did not happen until the 19th century, and for personal status
code it was the end of the 19th century.
Takhayur (incorporation) became part of the codification process in Muslim
family law; “In drafting a Code for a certain country that adhered to the views of a major
school of jurisprudence, a jurist is permitted to abandon the jurisprudence of that school
on a particular matter and adopt a competing point of view offered by another major
school, if he deemed the latter superior.”76 The doctrine of incorporation, as coined by
Al-Hibri, also allowed that where the Code is silent on family matters, it can be
supplemented by the jurisprudence of the school to which the country officially adheres.
The Codes tended to be incomplete and the authority (and ultimately the responsibility)
of adjudication resided with the judge alone.77
The Four Sunni Schools of fiqh, or jurisprudence, start from the Qur’an, so the
differences among the Schools are not dramtically different, and each School recognizes
the validity of the other three. However, the historical context in which the Schools
emerge, namely from a dispute about the primacy of r’ay (opinion) and hadiths, creates
subtly different characteristics of each School. In the mid-8th century, scholars began to
write down the hadith, rather than relying on oral tradition. Differences of interpretation
grew as more hadiths were formalized and disseminated. At first, the sides in this conflict
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were determined more by geography than theological reasoning. Meccan and Medinan
jurists emphasized “tradition as their standard for legal decisions,” whereas the Ancient
Schools in Basra and Kufa (Iraq) relied on r’ay. Their rationale for r’ay initially grew
because the primary sources (Qur’an and hadith) did not account for all situations that
Muslims encountered. As hadith compilations became increasingly accessible and more
authoritative, many Muslims found the use of r’ay less compelling, thus demanding a
more infrastructure and consistent means of interpretation. Supporters of the hadith
stressed that human reasoning could not be a source of law because of its fallibility.78
Amidst this debate of opinion versus original text, the ruling Caliphates factored
into the development of Islamic jurisprudence. The Umayyad courts failed “to implement
the spirit of the original laws of Islam propounded in the Quran,” and scholar’s ideas
would become the official word on “true Islamic religious ethic.”79 The failure of the
Umayyad Caliphate to rule within Islamic principles, according to these religious
scholars, forced the Schools to seek adjudication free from outside the governing
authority. The tension between the government executive authority and Islamic judicial
authority persists to this day. With the rise and fall of the Omayyad and Abbasid
Caliphates, the separation between political and religious authorities grew. Political unity
under the caliphate disappeared. Ideological, religious unity became essential for the
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stability and order of the Muslim community from the mid-10th century to the rise of the
Ottomans in the early sixteenth century.80
Constructing a unified shari’a (Islamic law) applicable to all Muslims served as
an important motivation to each of the founders of the Four Sunnite Schools.81 Most
Muslims today adhere to one school of thought.82 The Hanafi School of Shari’a law is the
oldest of the Four Schools, founded, although not finalized, by Imam Abu Hanifa AlNo’man (699-787 AD). After the first four Caliphs, and in the wake of the hegemony of
the Umayyad dynasty, it became necessary to form an ideology of shari’a that preserved
fundamental Islamic beliefs. As a result, Imam Hanifa developed a theory of law from an
originally obscure collection of hadiths, emphasizing “rational systems… as an
independent basis for legal discussion.”83
Rationalism remains the focus of usual al-fiqh (roots of jurisprudence). The
Hanafi School was the dominant school of jurisprudence in the Abbasid Caliphate and
the Ottoman Empire, and remains the leading legal authority in their successor states,
claiming one-third of all Muslims. The Hanafi School is the first school and is considered
one of the most liberal. Analysts believe that its more flexible ideology was influenced by
its origin in the Ancient Schools of Basra and Kufa, located in the commercial cross-
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roads of Iraq84 where ra’ay was also originally popular. The Hanafi School of
jurisprudence remains the main school of fiqh used in Jordan and Iraq today.85 For the
purposes of this thesis, it will be the only school of jurisprudence examined.
Abu Hanifa
Born in Kufa, Iraq in 699 A.D, Abu Hanifa was a Persian silk manufacturer and
merchant, which likely influenced the formation of his views. For instance, the Hanafi
School was the first to articulate comprehensive rules on contracts.86 He rose to
prominence as a scholar through his role as a teacher. As a scholar, Abu Hanifa was less
concerned with technical legal problems than with broader, deeper, theoretical issues.87,
88

As a result, Abu Hanifa stressed the freedom of belief and the inability of fellow

Muslims to judge the heart of their fellow Muslims. Throughout his lifetime, the Muslim
faith collectively struggled with whether humans could comprehend the manner in which
Allah is just. The Caliph Ma’mun (r. 813-833AD) officially answered “no.” Hanifa
refused to take a particular position, as neither the Qur’an nor Sunnah were clear, so
other opinions should be respected. This preference for personal liberty and intra-Muslim
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diversity of belief is evident throughout his fiqh.89 Hanifa maintained that neither the
community nor the government has the authority to interfere in the personal liberty of the
individual so long as the latter has not violated the law.90
On the subject of personal status law, Abu Hanifa believed an adult female may
conclude a marriage contract without a legal guardian present, an interpretation different
from the other schools of thought, and indeed state laws today, which instead borrow the
role of guardians in marriage from other schools and tribal or cultural customs.91 Abu
Hanifa did not finalize the Sunnite School of thought named after him.
It was actually two of Hanifa’s students that had the greatest impact on the Hanafi
School: Abu Yusuf and Shaybani. Abu Yusuf was a lawyer and because the Abbasid
Caliphate favored the Hanafi School, Yusuf was appointed as Chief Justice by Caliph
Harun al-Rashid (786-809AD). His jurisprudential beliefs were eminently practical, and
he was also aware of the reaction of the Caliphate to such beliefs. This vocational
approach may have influenced his criticism that the doctrine developed by Abu Hanifa
was grounded in the Sunnah of the Prophet insufficiently, an opinion later published at
the request of Caliph Harun al-Rashid.92 Similarly, Shaybani criticized the lack of
Qur’anic and Sunnah-based thought. Shaybani chronicled everything in voluminous
detail, creating the corpus juris (body of law) of the Hanafi School. In 787 AD, Abu
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Hanifa died while in Baghdad prison. He had refused to accept an appointment as a qadi
(Islamic judge)93 and supported a moderate rationalist Shi’ite revolt, which naturally
angered political authorities at the time.94
Sources of Hanafi Jurisprudence
Abu Hanifa wished to provide a rational basis for a unified Sharia applicable to all
believers. The reasoning being “if all Muslims were subject to God’s law, then there
should not be any difference in law between one Muslim, and another, regardless of
where they might reside.”95 In the Hanafi School, if the Quran speaks definitively on a
matter then its Divine revelation is final. In the hierarchy of Hanafi law, the Sunnah ranks
next, because the intention of the Prophet can be derived from his acts.
Abu Hanifa favored more flexibility than the current Hanafi School allows. He
included ijtihad (independent reasoning) in order to allow the Shari’a to adapt to
changing social circumstances. Abu Hanifa also permitted for the use of qiyas (analogical
reasoning), istihsan (juristic preference), and r’ay (subjective opinion). All these
principles provided judges considerable discretion that resulted in unpredictable results.
The successors of Hanifa came to regard themselves as followers practicing taklid
(imitation), despite Abu Hanifa’s emphasis on independent thought.96 Hanifa once stated:
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“when you are faced with evidence, then speak for it and apply it.”97 Junior qudat used
this reasoning as an invitation to challenge their superiors, claiming the prior ruling did
not have all the evidence. Islamic inquiry became restricted after the Closing of the Gate
to Ijtihad (about 900 AD).98
After his death, more compilations of the non-Prophetic utterances of Muhammad
were available. By the 10th century, the sources of law recognized by the Hanafi School
were different from the ones championed by Hanifa himself.99
Examining the Qur’an
The Qur’an gives women many more rights than those granted to them by law or
custom in most Muslim countries, mainly because of selective ‘interpretations’ and
patriarchal tradition carried out by male judges.100 For example, according to the Qur’an
women retain control of their wealth after marriage (a radical idea compared to tribal
custom). Women were also entitled to inherit their parents’ wealth and it could not be
disinherited.101 Judges find, instead, arguments to justify female seclusion, arranged child
marriages, polygamy and subjugation of women. The Qur’an is quoted for giving women
a status below men102 and for giving men ‘authority over women’ who are to be beaten if
97
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they are ‘disobedient.’103 Nonetheless the Qur’an sees women as independent individuals
responsible for their beliefs and actions, good or bad, and are rewarded accordingly.104
The Qur’an describes marriage as an easy and flexible (temporary or permanent)
relationship between consenting adults and only in the case of a slave girl is the
permission of a “master” required for marriage.105 There is no prescribed stigma attached
to divorce and remarriage, and though ‘secret meetings’ are discouraged, they are not
forbidden.106 Polygamy is allowed but not encouraged; the Qur’an insists on maintaining
‘equality’ among the wives and warns that ‘try as you may, you cannot treat all your
wives impartially’107 and advises that men should ‘marry one (wife) only.’108 Thus, a
Muslim man who follows the Qur’an should find it hard if not impossible to marry more
than one wife at a time.109
The Qur’anic view of marriage as an institution is considerably more flexible than
current Islamic practice. Although women are expected to be obedient to their husband,
they are also seen as individuals who could be unhappy with a man; Women could ‘fear
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ill-treatment or desertion on the part of the husband’ and could ‘seek a mutual agreement’
to end the marriage110 or even be unfaithful.
Adulterers, men and women, are sinners and should be punished by 100 lashes
(50 for slaves).111 But the Qur’an also teaches that it a sin to accuse people of adultery112
unless there are four witnesses to the crime,

113

making proof a difficult endeavor. If a

man accuses his wife of adultery ‘but has no witness except himself’ and she denies it by
swearing ‘four times by Allah that his charge is false and calls down His curse upon
herself if it be true, she shall receive no punishment.’114 Adulterers may of course confess
to the act and accept the punishment, and afterward they may only marry other
adulterers.115
Divorce is relatively easy under the rules of the Qur’an (particularly for men) and
needs little justification. On the other hand, there is no stigma attached to divorce and
remarriage mentioned in the Qur’an. Men are required to retain their divorced wives ‘in
honor or let them go with kindness’116 and ‘it is unlawful for husbands to take anything
they had given [their wife].’117
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A single set of laws from the Qur’an explicitly governing marriage only
developed under the organized efforts of the Hanafi School of jurisprudence. Until that
point various communities were determining different results from the same text due to
differences in judicial interpretation, cultural practices, etc. The Hanafi School sought to
create a centralized legal system that organized the Qur’an and its supplementary texts by
topic and develop the discipline of interpreting religious texts by understanding their
rigidity and the appropriate use of critical thinking, imitation, and past rulings in a given
case. The Hanafi School remained dominant in the Ottoman Empire. It gave stability
among the social lives of Muslims.
Ottoman Millet System
The court records from before state codification began in the late nineteenth
century show that the court system was flexible and was an institution to litigate disputes
rather than enforce norms. Ottoman records from Egypt show that women appeared in
court routinely for monetary concerns, to dispute ownership of property, and negotiate
marital matters. The sanctity of contracts and protection of women and children were
especially important. Egyptian Ottoman law was later adopted by Jordan, Iraq, and other
regional states.118 Without delving into too much detail, the legal administration in the
Ottoman Empire administered a millet system in which each religion had its own court to
adjudicate on personal states, or marriage, inheritance, divorce, custody, and other related
matters. The shari’a court would adjudicate for Muslims and in any legal gaps of other
118
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religious courts.119 This set a precedent for the separation between kanun (secular) and
shari’a law in society; Family affairs were to be determined by the individual’s belief
system and other matters were secular or of the state. It was an effective way to protect
minority Jewish and Christian populations at the time. The adjudication of personal status
in shari’a law in the modern state system, however, has become more about its
authoritative relationship as a court system.
Conclusion
From Jahiliyyah to the creation of the Ottoman millet system, the patriarchal
framework of personal status has been reinforced over the centuries. In the time of
Jahiliyyah the patriarchal framework was reinforced by the economic conditions of tribal
society. Islam introduced a uniting societal framework that included progressive ideas
about women’s rights, including marriage and divorce. After the death of the Prophet
Muhammad and the spread of Islam, there was significant pressure to codify Islam’s
religious texts for guidance in shari’a courts. Abu Hanifa, the founder of the first Islamic
school of jurisprudence, supported individual thought when examining the texts for
guidance. His students who finalized the law in conjunction with government guidance,
opted for a more rigid jurisprudence. The Hanafi School, the major school of
jurisprudence in both Jordan and Iraq, became the dominant school of jurisprudence
under the Ottoman Empire. Shari’a courts under the Ottoman Empire were the sole
courts to dictate matters of marriage, custody, divorce, and inheritance for Muslims. It set
a precedent for separate court systems in much of the Middle East.
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JORDAN
Defining the Critical Juncture
The critical juncture in the development of personal status law in Jordan is the
establishment of the separate court systems during its founding in the 1950s. This
essentially solidified the autonomy of the shari’a court that had been established under
the Ottoman Empire and the millet system, which was also accepted in the British
Mandate period. The shari’a court kept its adjudication of personal status in the Personal
Status Law in 1976. The law, while it sought to assert state authority after a politically
tumultuous time, did not create a unified law for every citizen to follow; It maintained a
set of regulations for the shari’a court for Muslims. If anything the law asserted the
authority of the shari’a court in the face of informal tribal courts. In the 1990s, women
activism in Jordan was quelled and then co-opted in a royalty led organization. Actions to
challenge women’s rights have been diluted with moderate government responses.

Political Development
Trans-Jordania’s famous land-trade, lacking stability and security along the
traditional route, dwindled and virtually disappeared by the ninth century; it was
especially undermined as maritime traders connected the Indian Ocean and the
Mediterranean. Cities and villages disappeared. Bedouins remained. The economy only
began to reawaken when the Ottoman Hijaz Railway was built in the early 1900s.120
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World War I action in the Middle East and, a few years later, the memoirs of T.E.
Lawrence (Seven Pillars of Wisdom), reintroduced Trans-Jordania to the West as a vague,
undefined area east of the Jordan Trench. Great Britain, the League of Nations’
mandatory power for both sides of the Jordan Valley, initially oversaw the TransJordania area through the Palestinian mandate administration, but it declared to East
Bank sheikhs and notables at al-Salt in August 1920 that it favored self-government for
them. British Middle East experts and Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill met in Cairo
in March 1921 and agreed that the budding trans-Jordan realm should become a separate
league mandate under the British, ruled by the Hashemite Amir Abdullah who helped
lead the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire.
The decision had two aims: (1) to create a token fulfillment of the British
promises to the Arabs in the Husain-McMahon correspondence of 1915-1916;121 and (2)
to placate the Hashemite family—direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad—in the
person of Amir Abdullah ibn Husain, son of the Sharif of Mecca and brother of Amir
Feisal, who was king of Iraq. Churchill met with Amir Abdullah in Jerusalem and
informed him of the plan. All Middle East mandates were in play by September 1923.
The Jordanian Constitution of 1928 recognized existing Ottoman codes of personal status
until 1952.122 The Trans-Jordan emirate became an independent kingdom on May 25,
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1946, under the Treaty of London, which declared Amir Abdullah as king of the current
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.123
The Bedouin tribes that dominated pre-modern Jordan built their society on a way
of life that depended on battling for resources. As a consequence, chivalry, courage,
generosity, loyalty, and functionality were among the prized characteristics in society.
The man’s primary function was protector but women worked (i.e. tending to livestock)
and contributed to the general welfare of the tribe. Some tribes under the emergence of
the modern state chose to keep their lifestyle, although nomadic travel was later
restricted. Others played a role in the Jordanian army and integrated with the emerging
state order, making tribalism a powerful element in the Lower House and in the general
fabric of Jordan’s sociopolitical alliances.124 Laurie Brand, a professor of international
relations at the University of Southern California School of International Relations
specializing in the inter-Arab relations, explains:
The basis for the earliest forces established by the British were the powerful
Bedouin tribes of the southern part of the country. Such recruitment filled the
ranks of the military and security apparatus and provided a key means by which
these tribes were incorporated into the state. This cooptation, or establishment of
patron-client ties between the tribes and the leadership, was a central element in
building a legitimacy formula for [King] ‘Abdullah [I].125
The hierarchy of tribal society was integrated into the hierarchy of the state in
order to ensure a stable nation-state. Tribal politics are a central part of Jordan today. As
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a consequence, the Bedouin traditional family practices are informally considered among
judges who adjudicate personal status cases. The religious and tribal norms of the tribe
are protected as patriarchal practices become tradition. Jordan has multiple hierarchical
frameworks in play: the tribal, the Medieval Islamic jurisprudence from the Hanafi
School of jurisprudence, the monarchy, and that of the nation-state. Their patriarchal
tendencies, to ensure power for men over women, overlap and reinforce each other.
Creation of Israel
When the state of Israel was created on May 14, 1948, Jordan’s character changed
dramatically in a political-geographical, demographic, economic, and social manner.
Thousands of Palestinian refugees crossed over the Jordan River. King Abdullah
tentatively annexed the West Bank, and Jordan became a factor in the history of ArabIsraeli relations and remains central to the issue to this day. In July 1948, a ceasefire was
agreed upon and the armistice concluded in April 1949 between Israel and Jordan. The
Kingdom left Israel in control of West Jerusalem (the Old City) and the area of Palestine
closest to Jordan not conquered by the Israelis—the West Bank of the River Jordan.126
The West Bank was used as a territorial description, distinct from the East Bank (of the
Jordan) which constituted Jordan proper. The remainder of Palestine, the Gaza Strip,
came under Egyptian control during the war and was administered by the Egyptians until
the 1967 war.127
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The courts had stopped functioning during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Jordan’s
steps to administer law in the West Bank came in the form of military orders and
proclamations. As early as May 1948, a proclamation extended the 1935 Defense Law of
Jordan to the West Bank, and in December 1948, notables from the West Bank,
proclaiming a representative capacity, met in Nablus and Jericho to invite King Abdullah
of Jordan to annex the West Bank to his rule.128 Elections in the West Bank passed a
resolution on April 24, 1950 to declare the two banks as one state, the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan. It did not immediately receive international recognition,129 but was
given internal constitutional effect by an enactment of August the same year, subjecting
the West Bank including East Jerusalem to Jordanian law. A committee of lawyers and
judges were set up to work towards unifying the laws of the two banks of Jordan. Jordan
had governed itself under the Mandate authority, governing largely by Ottoman legal
tradition and with less British influence than Palestine. Jordan legislation came to cover
most areas of penal, commercial and procedural law, with Ottoman law remaining in
force in certain traditional areas, including personal status law.130
The Law of Establishment of Shari’a Courts in 1951 had unified the shari’a court
system that convened in both Jerusalem and Amman, but in 1951 a law provided for a
single Shari’a Court of Appeal, based in Amman,131 although it could convene in
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Jerusalem if necessary under Israeli occupation.132 Jerusalem had lost its Shari’a Court of
Appeal when it had become a British Mandate.133 Jordan ruled the West Bank until the
war of 1967, much of the time under a state of emergency declared in 1956.134 Partly
because of his confidential dealings with the Israelis—an ill-kept secret—King Abdullah
was assassinated in din al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in 1951. He was succeeded briefly
by his son Talal, who was in turn succeeded in 1952 by his eighteen-year-old son,
Hussein.135
Women’s Movement Emerges
With the surge of Palestinian refugees and a new king in 1952, the mid-20th
century was open to the advent of political parties, despite it not being completely legal
because political parties were technically banned. In this environment, the Jordanian
Women’s Alliance formed in 1954 under the leadership of Emily Bisharat, who later
became Jordan’s first female lawyer. The Alliance sought suffrage and a woman’s right
to run for election. It was the first overtly political women’s group. Other groups
previously had kept to social issues of maternity. The women’s group gained hundreds of
members and wrote to the King, the prime minister, and the houses of parliament
demanding amendments for their political rights. In 1955, it was determined that
educated women with elementary certificates could vote. The Alliance fought for the
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rights of the illiterate with a petition and had gained political support among officials.
However, the Alliance’s strong position on Palestine created conflict between itself and
the government. Their activities had to stop when there was a general political crackdown
on all opposition nationalist movements. All political parties were dissolved and the
organized women’s movement went underground and joined the Communist or Ba’ath
party developing across the Arab world.136
Legal Development
The legal developments in the mid-20th century began with the 1951 Courts
Establishment Law, which instructs the sharia courts to make their decisions in
accordance with the most approved opinion of the Hanafi school, unless there is a
contrary provision of statutory law on the subject.137 According to the Court
Establishment Law and the Constitution, the judiciary is supposed to be independent
from all other branches. There are three types of courts in Jordan: the civil, religious and
special courts, all made up of one or more judges but no juries. Jordanian legislators
developed an independent national code on marriage, divorce and related matters,
preceding a series of similar national codes by other Arab states in the 1950s. The
Jordanian Law of Family Rights (JLFR) was promulgated in 1951 for application in the
shari’a courts. The JLFR was modeled on the Ottoman Law of Family Rights (OLFR)
and did not deviate from the millet system of separate courts for different religions. In
1951 the first Jordanian law organizing shari’a courts was passed and it remained in

136

Sherry R. Lowrance. “After Beijing: Political Liberalization and the Women’s Movement in Jordan.”
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, (July 1998), 89-91. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283953>
137

Article 22 of the Law on the Establishment of Shari’a Courts, 1951.

44

effect until 1972 and later when several amendments were introduced. The move was a
continuation of the split in adjudication under the mejelle Ottoman reforms of the
nineteenth century, based on the Hanafi school of jurisprudence that was more flexible
with government authoritarianism.138 Section VI of Jordan’s Constitution established
three types of courts: the national court (mahakim nizamiyya), religious courts (mahakim
diniyya) and special tribunals (mahakim khassa).139
The Jordanian constitution stipulates the independence of the judiciary140 while
other laws, facts, and experiences in practice of law in Jordan assert a stronger pull in the
authority of the King. Article 30 of the Constitution of Jordan (1952) establishes that “the
king is the head of state and represents the supreme authority in the hierarchy power and
he has constitutional immunity against all liabilities.”141 The Jordanian constitution
requires that the Ministry of Justice, with the King’s approval, assigns judges to serve in
all three courts. The Ministry of Justice also has the ability to transfer, promote and
dismiss them.142Appointments are often haphazard and appointees lack proficiency.143
All judicial judgments are to be pronounced in the name of the King. Legislative power is
also vested in the National Assembly and the King. The Jordanian monarchy has
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sustained itself despite the surrounding coups of other Hashemite kings in Egypt and Iraq.
To this day, it remains the only Hashemite kingdom.
The Law on the Establishment of Regular Courts (1952) granted the civil courts
jurisdiction over all persons in civil and criminal matters except those under the
jurisdiction of the religious courts or special tribunals. The shari’a courts retained their
customary jurisdiction over Muslims but did not regain the former jurisdiction of
Ottoman times. The Jordanian Constitution specifies the jurisdiction of shari’a court as
exclusively on questions of personal status for Muslim parties or partial Muslim parties
that agree to shari’a court jurisdiction.144 The personal status of foreigners was left to the
regular courts under their own national law.145 The personal status rulings in non-Muslim
religious courts were to include the same issues as in the shari’a courts, an expansion of
jurisdiction for the non-Muslim courts compared to Mandate times. The Jordanian state
initially recognized five Christian denominations as having this jurisdictional
competence.146 The qadis in the shari’a courts for Muslim parties were appointed by the
Jordanian Qadi al-Quda, or chief qadi whose status is that of a government minister, and
with the approval of the King.147
Jordanian legislators continued the Ottoman tradition by retaining Hanafi fiqh as
the residual jurisprudence of the shari’a courts, even though some of the population is
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also Shafi’i.148 When the Palestinian territories came under control of the Israeli army in
1967, the shari’a courts were said to be interfered by the Israeli Officer in charge of the
Judiciary.149 This augmented a fear among the shari’a courts that the state will replace
their adjudication authority. An article by a shari’a lawyer and one by a qadi in the
shari’a courts, stressed that it needed independence from political change: “the political
order must have no influence upon the work of the shari’a courts, whatever the source be
of such political motive: for temporal politics has no fixed constants…”150 The concern
for politically inspired interference was legitimate but the shari’a courts remained
autonomous.
Jordan’s Law of Family Rights modeled itself on Ottoman Law and its court
system also modeled itself on the religiously divided system under the Ottoman Empire
in matters of personal status. For the relationship between the state and shari’a courts, on
the surface this removes the gender framework of society from the state. In reality, it
demands an alignment of gender framework between the state and shari’a courts. The
king approves the judges of all shari’a courts, who then hand down the verdict of any
given personal status case based on the Hanafi school that had been aligned with the
Ottoman Empire. The patriarchal framework governing personal status, rather than
changing at the moment of nationhood, was reinforced through the adoption of a court
system and school of jurisprudence that is a bricolage of tribal traditions, medieval
Islamic jurisprudence, and Ottoman judicial preference.
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1967-1976
King Hussein balanced the various interests in Jordan and its geopolitical
relations. Hussein often chose a moderate and mediating role, seeking consensus
sometimes at great risk. In 1967, however, he agreed to join Egypt and Syria against
Israel in the 1967 June (“Six-Day”) War. Jordan suffered heavy military and territorial
losses, surrendering all areas west of the Jordan River in the territorial readjustments after
the war. Jordan also lost more than a third of its most educated population, much of its
arable land, and its Holy Land sites. Territorially, the kingdom returned to its transJordan status of pre-1948, but King Hussein only renounced all legal ties with the West
Bank until August 1988.151 The most serious of the confrontations within Jordan was the
showdown between the government and Palestinian Fedayeen in September 1970 (called
“Black September” by some Palestinians), when an estimated 3,300 were killed on both
sides. In this civil war, the Jordan Arab Army (sometimes referred to as the Arab Legion)
asserted control of the kingdom and forced the withdrawal of the Fedayeen, mostly to
Lebanon. King Hussein and the PLO leader Yasser Arafat reconciled, but their relations
remained strained.152 The Kingdom of Jordan was in political turmoil, so it’s no surprise
that the women’s movement that resurged at the same time was directed by the
government.
In 1974, Emily Bisharat re-established the original women’s movement under the
new banner: The Women’s Union. This was able to happen as 1975 was designated the
“International Women’s Year” by the United Nations and a preparation committee
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pressed for the establishment of a women’s union. Before the Women’s Union could
create an international scene by demanding political rights for women, the government
amended the election law and allowed women the right to vote and run for parliamentary
elections. The next parliamentary elections were not for another ten years, and women’s
right to vote in municipal elections was not granted until that time. The political strength
of the Women’s Union continued to grow and within a few years of its re-emergence,
over half of the 3,000 members resided outside the capital in Amman. Due to the
Women’s Union vocal resistance to the government’s policy on Palestinian issues, the
union leaders had their passports confiscated and could not be hired due to required
security checks.153 Furthermore, the Jordanian government established the Personal
Status Law of 1976
Personal Status Law of 1976
The Personal Status Law (No. 61 of 1976) regulates the jurisdiction of Shari’a
courts for Muslims, Druze, and Baha’is.154 The Personal Status Law of 1976 is not a
secularization of personal status. The religious shari’a courts officially adjudicate on
matter of personal status and the Personal Status Law is meant to guide such rulings as a
means of “regulation.” In other words the state is not the authority in matters of marriage,
divorce, custody, and inheritance and the shari’a court maintains their legal domain in
Jordanian society. In 1976, the Jordanian government also abolished tribal courts. Yet, as
one Amman lawyer phrases it, the tribal rules are seen as “customs and traditions…
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preferred by most families in Jordan.”155 Shari’a courts incorporate some tribal practices,
such as required reconciliation attempts that involve the family in the case of divorce and
diyya (blood money), or in this case marriage to absolve a crime. The Personal Status
Law made tribal laws informal, which may still be incorporated at the will of the judge.
There is no jury in any court of law, including shari’a courts, so the verdict of any case is
determined by the judge. As Amira El-Azhary Sonbol explains in her book Women of
Jordan: “So, on the one hand, Jordan honors ‘rule of law’; on the other, ‘rule of law’
means [what is] acceptable to civil society and reflective of its traditions…”156 Below is a
summary of the provisions of the law.
Personal Status Law of 1976: Marriage
The legal age of marriage for males and females is 18 years but the chief justice
may permit marriage to anyone who is 15 years old if it is in his or her interest. The
shari’a judge determines if the marriage is appropriate even if the woman’s guardian
opposes it, usually considering financial matters of the prospective husband.157 The
marital guardian must be a Muslim and sane male relative of the future bride. Under
Article 19, the bride can request in the marriage contract that her husband not force her to
leave country and that he does not take a second wife. She may also request a clause to
obtain rights to divorce. In practice of this right is rarely exercised because women are
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either unaware or afraid of the risks involved in seeking such privileges.158 Under Article
40 a man who has more than one wife must treat all his wives equitably and provide them
with separate dwellings.159 As of an amendment in 2001, the courts are required to inform
each wife of the others’ existence. It is legal to have up to four wives. Polygamy is
generally uncommon but more prevalent in rural areas. Under Article 37, the wife owes
obedience, cohabitation to her husband, and has an obligation to follow him so long as he
ensures her safety. If she refuses, she loses her right to financial support (nafaqa). She
may also lose her right to nafaqa if she works outside the home without the consent of
her husband. Article 39 explains that the husband must maintain his wife and treat her
well in exchange for obedience. Article 66 obliges a husband to provide for the financial
maintenance of his wife, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care. If the wife
wants to work, her husband must agree to it, and he cannot negate her right to
maintenance if he agrees to it.160
Personal Status Law of 1976: Guardianship
Welaya (guardianship) is a system in Jordanian law that originates from its tribal
tradition. A male relative is appointed to act on behalf of and in the interests of a minor or
any other person of limited legal capacity, that is to say any single woman under the age
of 40 no matter her marital status. The punishment for rebelling against a guardian is
revocation of the woman’s financial maintenance. Islamic legal principles allow women
to be legal guardians of their children. The Personal Status Law only allows men to be
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legal guardians of their children, giving tribal custom priority. Women may have custody
of the child, however.161
The welaya code was not replaced by shari’a law during the Ottoman Empire but
rather the two were overlaid to strengthen to power of the waliy. In the pre-modern
period, the waliy could be the mother or the father, but under the “marriage,” so to speak,
of tribal law and shari’a law, the waliy is now only considered to be the father. His
authority in the determining the marriage of his daughter is sound in shari’a courts of
law.162
Personal Status Law of 1976: Divorce
The most common divorce is talaq, or when a husband may divorce his wife
without legal reason and he may do so orally or in writing. It must eventually be
registered by the court. The woman divorced has a right to compensation for at least one
year but no more than three years. The amount is determined by the court and is based on
the husband’s financial status. Article 135 enforces iddat, or a waiting period of up to 3
months to ensure that he wife is not pregnant by the husband divorcing her. If the wife
wishes to initiate divorce she must do so with valid reasoning. While domestic abuse is
valid reasoning for a woman to divorce her husband, she must have two male witnesses;
her testimony alone is not enough. The husband’s failure to provide financial
maintenance or shelter and absence for more than a year are also valid reasoning for the
wife to initiate divorce.
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Under an amendment to the Personal Status Law in 2001, a woman may also seek
khula, or a woman’s unilateral divorce that requires her to return her dowry and give up
rights to financial maintenance. The lower house of Parliament tried to ban the practice in
2003 and 2004.163 Under Article 87 the husband can mandate another person to repudiate
his wife. Under certain conditions164, the wife has the right to seek divorce if she can
prove that she has suffered damage or ill-treatment, the decision remaining with the
judge. Under Article 134, in case of divorce without legitimate cause, the judge grants
compensation to the wife, not exceeding the equivalent of one year’s maintenance.
Article 132 states that either spouse may petition for divorce on the grounds of discord
and strife causing harm that makes cohabitation impossible.
If either the husband or the wife petitions and demonstrates sufficient evidence,
the judge must try to reconcile the spouses, adjourn the trial for at least a month, and then
if the spouses still fail to reconcile, the case is submitted to the arbitration of two
arbitrators, usually one member of each family or two men who are capable of
reconciliation. If reconciliation fails and the wrongs are on the wife’s side, the arbitrators
grant divorce in exchange for compensation at least equal to the dowry. If the wrongs are
on the husband’s side, they decree irrevocable divorce, and the wife can demand all her
rights as if the husband had repudiated her. If the wrongs are shared, they grant the
divorce in exchange for a division of the dower in proportion to the wrongs of each side.
The judge ultimately accepts or denies the report made by the arbitrators.
Personal Status Law of 1976: Custody
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Under Article 154, the husband is the legal guardian of the children; the wife is
only entitled to custody.165 The wife maintains custody of her children until they reach
the age of puberty, at which point the children decide who they will live with. If the
mother remarries, she loses custody and the children live with their biological father or
either of their grandmothers. As legal guardian, the father decides the place of residence
and education of his children.166 In other words, the mother may take care of the children
but the authority figure in the children’s lives will be the father.
Personal Status Law of 1976: Inheritance
Under Act N 34, the father is the head of the family, and in the event of death or
of loss of nationality, while his wife (wives) and children are nationals, the first wife or
the elder son becomes head of the family.167 The terms of inheritance in the case of death
are negotiated at the time of the contract. No specific rules as to the ratio of inheritance
are given.168
Nationality (not determined in the Jordan Personal Status Law of 1976)
While the laws determining nationality are not found in the Personal Status Law
of 1976, it remains an instrumental part of gender hierarchy between men and women in
Jordan. The Jordanian Nationality Law of 1954 was modelled on British nationality laws.
It was amended in 1987. The grounds for granting nationality include anyone born to a
father holding Jordanian nationality; anyone born in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to
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a mother holding Jordanian nationality and to a father whose citizenship is unknown, or
who is stateless, or whose paternity has not been legally established; and anyone born in
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to unknown parents. A man of Jordanian nationality
may grant a non-Jordanian wife nationality if she has resided in the country for a period
of three years and she is an Arab national or for five years if she is of non-Arab
nationality. A woman cannot do the same. A non-Jordanian husband may waive the
restrictions by investing in Jordan, residing for at least four years and with the intention
of residence, and whose legal employment does not compete with Jordanians. The
Jordanian woman cannot pass on her nationality to her children if she is married to a nonJordanian while a Jordanian man can pass his nationality to his children if he is married
to a non-Jordanian woman. Children with only a Jordanian mother are not nationally
recognized and are not registered in their Jordanian mother’s passport, which is stamped
“Children are not included due to the different nationality of the father.” The Nationality
Law is based on blood ties and not on land.169 The government explains that allowing
women to transfer their citizenship to their husbands and children would encourage the
immigration and assimilation of non-Jordanians.170
Analysis of the Jordanian Personal Status Law (1976)
Jordan’s government was pre-emptive in response to international pressure for the
creation of the Women’s Union. Anticipating the organization’s demands, the
government granted women the right to vote and run for election, creating a spectacle of
progressive reform without strong reinforcement. This is echoed again in the Personal
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Status Law of 1976, which on the surface asserts state control. However, the law is not a
secularization of personal status nor is it meant for all Jordanian citizens. It is a law
meant to regulate personal status in shari’a courts without changing a centuries-old
framework for personal status. The laws governing nationality are complimentary to this
institutional framework; The laws are patriarchal in that they give much more liberty to a
male citizen than a female citizen while also being a legal remnant from the British
mandate. Jordan incorporates multiple patriarchal frameworks that overlay nicely, while
external women’s rights movements have been shut-down for political reasons or simply
made null through surface-level progressivity.
Significant Political Development
In 1981, the Interior Ministry ordered the Women’s Union to close due to
supposed legal violations. The government’s pressure and intimidation forced the Union
to close in 1982.171 At the same time, the General Federation of Jordanian Women
(GFJW) formed in 1982 under the leadership of the first woman minister, In’am Mufti,
Minister of Social Development. The GFJW, both a member and an umbrella
organization, was a pro-government group that came to dominate women’s politics. Most
members could not have a past in oppositional politics. Some organizations refused to
join or send delegates under the umbrella organization, which they saw as an effort to
centralize and control women’s politics. After Islamist women began registering as
independent individual members, who would likely challenge the politics of the
government and the matter of Palestine, the organization came under the scrutiny of the
government who ruled that individual membership was no longer allowed and the GFJW
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was to remain an umbrella organization. Its legitimacy began to wane among women in
Jordan.172 GFJW was the first attempt to consolidate the women’s movement and control
its political agenda.
King Hussein attempted to introduce limited democratic elements in the late 20th
century, but had to balance the interests of his Palestinian constituents and his still
somewhat tribal, native East Bank subjects. In 1990, he faced a grave dilemma when
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and decided it was better to support the Iraqi position
of Saddam Hussein rather than denounce Iraq. King Hussein was immediately isolated,
with all aid from the Gulf states, the United States, and Europe canceled. Thousands of
Jordanian and Palestinian expatriate workers in the Gulf were expelled and returned to a
shaky economy at home. The tradeoff was the King’s popularity and a more unified
national identity.173 The popularity of the monarchy was utilized for seemingly
benevolent control of the women’s movement.
In 1992, Princess Basma Bint Talal, King Hussein’s sister, formed the Jordanian
National Committee for Women (JNCW), composed of several ministers, national
organizations, members of the private sector, and other leaders related to women’s
affairs. The policy goals developed under the 1993 National Strategy for Women in
Jordan were likely made deliberately vague so that they could be interpreted as positive
in either a conservative or feminist reading. The goals were meant to marry Islamic
Jurisprudence principles, Arab and Muslim culture, and human rights. As the ‘strategy’
was implemented, a coalition formed and by December 1995, the Jordanian National
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Forum for Women, with more than 40,000 members, emerged as an NGO recognized by
the government. Jordan successfully “nationalized” the women’s movement in its
borders, with a member of the royal family as its founder and other government officials
making policy, it created a vehicle for carefully measured progress that would not bring
other politics into the fray. The organization sets the policy agenda and ensures that the
local organizations carry them out within an acceptable range of interpretation.174
The JNCW did not emerge when Jordan was a strong state, but rather when it
depended economically on the IMF’s readjustment programs and had experienced
uncontrolled political challenges from previous women’s organizations. Old intimidation
practices were no longer necessary. However, membership with the Jordanian Women’s
Union slowly grew and the number of other registered NGOs has increased with the
liberalization policy. The Muslim Brotherhood even formed its own political party
separate from the Hashemite monarchy in 1992. Political parties, such as the Islamic
Action Front (IAF), have supported its own subsection of women’s rights groups.
However, as the Muslim organizations underscore their disagreement with the
government on the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship and other political policies, the
state has exercised tactics like “investigations,” teaching licensure refusals, and other
bureaucratic tactics of control.175
Measured progress was made under the liberalization policy, but significant
progress remains difficult. Toujan Faisal, the first elected female representative to the
lower house and a member of the opposition bloc, introduced legislation that would
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require men and women to have equal passport and nationality rights, including the
ability for Jordanian women to pass on their nationality to their children. However, they
were blocked in committee and never reach the house for a vote. The monarchy can
depend on the more conservative nature of the Parliament, especially the Lower House. It
serves as a check on more radical women’s rights leaders and their agendas.176 And if
certain policies are too unfavorably conservative, the monarchy can create moderate
vehicles for women’s issues, like the GFJW.
After the 1993 parliamentary elections, King Hussein made yet another risky
choice by signing a peace treaty with Israel under the moderate Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin, on October 26, 1994. This choice restored his image with the United States and
brought some direct economic rewards. However, the economy continued to suffer and
the government had to reduce subsidies, provoking riots in Karak and other cities in
August 1996 and causing a temporary suspension of the parliament. A significant antinormalization movement gained momentum and added to the political instability. King
Hussein died on February 7, 1999, at age sixty-three. He had ruled for forty-seven years.
His 37-year-old son, who succeeded him as King Abdullah I, reaffirmed the late King
Hussein’s stance for peace and moderation, ties to the West, and good relations with Arab
neighbors.177
Jordan went from closing the Women’s Union in 1981 to founding the GFJW; It
went from supporting Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait to signing a peace treaty with Israel. All
the while, it has slowly ensured the difficulty of truly challenging the institution of
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personals status. Parliament blocked any changed to the laws governing nationalism,
making it difficult for women to pass on their Jordanian nationality to non-citizens. Given
the delicacy of the economic reforms and the neighboring politics, it is unlikely that
Jordan would welcome internal political challenges.
The Campaign to Eliminate So-called Crimes of Honor (1999)
In 1999, the civilian coalition, the Campaign to Eliminate So- called Crimes of
Honor was founded.178 The Campaign gathered the signatures of Jordanian citizens in an
attempt to repeal the law that grants reduced penalties to men convicted of committing
honor crimes. The government, however, eventually co-opted the movement. When the
Campaign had sought publicity help and coordination from the Jordanian royalty and the
municipality of Amman, the government largely shut them out.179 A local deputies
explained, Jordanian society is religious and traditional, which means that the call to
cancel the Article that reduces sentencing to men convicted of honor crimes is a “call to
spread corrupt morals and obscenity and will bring total destruction to our
society.”180The secretary general of the Islamic Action Front Party explained that “the
women’s issue has been used by the West against Arabs and the Muslims to push Arab
women to abandon their honor and values and start acting like animals.”181 The law
seeking to cancel Article 340 bounced twice from being approved in the Upper House
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and rejected by the Lower House (largely made of tribal-loyal members). The royal
family staged a strategic political march as a spectacle, its participants were mostly men
and showed support for King and did not support cancelling Article 340.182 The
Campaign was used as a distraction. A judge in Jordan’s high court of appeals explains,
“We can’t simply let the women run free to do what they want.” The modern criminal
system enables judges to act on patriarchal biases rather than requiring them to observe
principles of the rule of law.183
The Campaign to Eliminate Crimes of So-Called Honor is an example of how the
state of Jordan challenges progressive, feminist grassroots movements that seek to
breakdown the patriarchal framework that holds personal status law together. Honor and
the paradox of protection are critical characteristics of the patriarchy in that they define
women’s docility. The politically staged march proves that the state of Jordan, if
pressured to do so, will create a progressive spectacle, like the election reforms
previously, in order to silence unwanted criticism without policy change.
The 2000s
King Abdullah I pushed for a “Jordan First” program and for further privatization
of state enterprises. The King’s relations with an increasingly assertive parliament caused
him to dissolve the body several times.184 In 2001, there were slight reforms and
modifications of personal status law, including requiring courts to inform wives of each
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other’s existence and khula, or unilateral divorce that includes the woman’s forfeit of her
dowry and financial maintenance.
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, King Abdullah I also stated that he was willing
to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. However, with the invasion of Iraq, he
managed public reaction skillfully. His well-conducted “Jordan First” program
emphasized the kingdom’s security as priority, and the king personally expressed to
President Bush and others that he was opposed to the invasion. He declined to send
troops, but he offered territory for coalition operations. He granted right of over-flights
by military aircrafts, and made other efforts to cooperate with the West. Jordan profited
economically as an offset to other losses.185
Overall, cyclic turbulence characterizes Jordan’s development: the 1948-1949
wars with the new state of Israel, the costly 1967 war, periodic border clashes, several
internal engagements between the army and insurgent groups, a series of internal coup
attempts, parliament suspensions and periodic socio-economic turmoil involving Jordan’s
efforts to balance its transnational interests with Palestinians on both sides of the Jordan
River. In the eyes of the Jordanian state, Personal Status Law is a pawn in its goal of
political stability.
De Facto
While the Jordanian government has tried to overhaul the problems between
women and the justice system, the “widespread patriarchal attitude within the society and
the court system routinely prevent women from taking full advantage of their legal rights
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and stigmatize victims of abuse.”186 This may be best demonstrated by the practice of
“protective custody” in Jordan. While it is not part of personal status law, the practice of
protective custody is part of the patriarchal paradox of protection that is essential to the
patriarchal framework in personal status law. It is a reinforcing adjudication practice.
A 2009 Human Rights Watch Report explains that the legal enforcement of the
Crime Prevention Law employs “gender-specific discrimination [that] has additional
consequences for women in administrative detention.”187 The employment of the law is
arbitrary and is often imposed against victims of crimes, such as women threatened with
violence, women who are running away (even from an abusive home)188, women who are
on the street at night, and victims of tribal threats of revenge. The law is manipulated so
that those who violate traditional social roles are targeted and put in “protective”
custody.189 A woman must have protective custody, yet it is likely that her relative might
have been involved in the threats that led to her detention. “The only other way for
women to be released from detention appears to be marriage, and governors have
suggested marriage to unknown men, again violating women’s human rights—the right to
enter into marriage of her own free will.”190 Only governors can determine whether a
woman can leave by determining whether she’s at risk of violence. The irony of this
evaluation of risk is that some women and girls have been killed after being returned to
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their families, reinforcing the inclination of authorities to detain them indefinitely. 191 The
women in custody are not dead but they are not free either. The government responded to
the routine implementation of protective custody in 2007 when it opened the Wifaq
Center for women at risk of violence.192
However, the women transferred from Juwaida women’s prison to the Wifaq
Center had to have the agreement of the family members who threatened the women, a
continuation of the same practice of oversight in protection custody cases. Hana’a alAfghani, the Director Juwaida told Human Rights Watch on October 23, 2007:
The governor starts with the family. Even when we transfer a case to [the NGO],
the family needs to know. We find one person to notify. They know where she is
and have information about her but the girls don’t know [that their family knows
their location]. If they did, they would prefer to stay in prison. The family must
agree. These are our norms and customs. We are a tribal society.193
Nedal Dweik, a lawyer who has represented administratively detained women for
over five years, told Human Rights Watch that authority is used “depending on their
mood,” and a governor can refuse to release a woman if her male sponsor has a criminal
record, the judge can keep her in custody if he perceives a continued threat against her
life, or simply to teach her a lesson for “misbehaving.”194
While parliament enacted the Family Protection Law (FPL) in January 2008,
which provided procedural instructions for cases of domestic violence, including
detaining the suspected abuser for 24 hours, the police are not required to enforce the law
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(there are no repercussions). Also, if the suspected abuser apologizes to the victim and
they agree to reconcile, which may often be the case under socio-cultural pressures, he
can return home without incarceration. A perpetrator may also marry a victim to avoid
punishment under Article 308 of the penal code, which is thought to protect the victim
from shame. The Family Reconciliation House (FRH) in Amman, created by the Ministry
of Social Development in 2007, was intended to provide victims with rehabilitation and
long-term solutions. Some conservative societies, however, may see it has a refuge for
“bad women.” Many women are still imprisoned for their own safety.195
Protective custody is an example of the institutionalization of the patriarchal
practices of tribes and shari’a court. The legal system in Jordan sees women as inherently
dependent on men, both financially and for security. When it became a state, rather than
creating a unified court system, it maintained the court system of the Ottoman Empire
and subsequently the British Mandate. Perhaps it made sense as the Jordanian state
remained the only Hashemite monarchy to survive from Mandate to nationhood. The
government also co-opted the women’s movement as a way to quell any serious political
challenges. If the government had established a different court system that challenged the
sacred space of the shari’a court in matters of personal status, the state would likely have
followed a different legal path of development, one that might have strayed further away
from previous legal and societal frameworks in the Ottoman Empire and under the British
mandate.
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Iraq
Defining the Critical Juncture
The critical juncture in the case of Iraq is the coup d’état of 1958 and its
supporting nationalism. With the overthrow of the old Hashemite King and the creation
of a republic, a ripe political environment, with a new ideology created an opportunity to
either develop personal status law into a codified law or maintain the practice within the
adjudication of shari’a courts. The new Republic of Iraq created Personal Status Law No.
188 in 1959. Right after the Gulf War, the Personal Status Law’s progressive nature was
undercut by various amendments to placate religious and tribal parties. In the deliberation
over personal status law during the interim government in 2005, the proposal for separate
adjudication of personal status law among respective communities, similar to that of the
Ottoman millet system, met fierce opposition and failed. Support for the 1959 personal
status law among the political parties in 2005 has been synonymous with the vision of a
societal hierarchy with a unified national community and a dominant state authority.
Political Development Prior to 1959
It is important to clarify that the British did not “create modern Iraq,” but
inherited three Ottoman provinces that were centrally run from Baghdad, including many
of the legal practices.196 Personal status law at this time was delegated to respective
community authorities but regulated under the Hanafi School of jurisprudence. Arab
nationalism was brewing and later led by Sherif Hussein of Mecca and his three sons
Abdullah, Feisal, and Ali, all descendants of the Prophet Muhammad who would later be
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kings under the British mandate territories. The British promised to help create an Arab
homeland that stretched from Arabia to the Levant and Iraq. After World War I and the
leak of the Sykes-Picot Agreement that divided Ottoman lands into British and French
spheres of influence, they felt their cause had been betrayed and evolved into infamous
Arab nationalists. The military officers would form the core of loyal military officers for
both King Abdullah bin Hussein of Jordan and King Feisal bin Hussein of Iraq.197
In accordance with the 1920 San Remo talks and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne,
mandate Iraq incorporated the three former Ottoman vilayets, or provinces, of Mosul,
Baghdad, and (partially) Basrah.198As part of a complex scheme for the British plans for
future hegemony over most of the Middle East, British regional specialists placed the
Hashemite Prince Feisal bin Hussein on the throne of the new kingdom. An arranged
plebiscite among the populace appeared to legitimize King Feisal’s accession. Iraq’s
military relationship to the Hashemite dynasty lasted from 1921 to 1958, until the Ba’ath
political coup. The Sunni domination of the armed forces, a remnant of Ottoman times,
was carried over by the British when it ran Iraq as a mandate from 1922-1932. After a
decade of tensions, Iraq became an independent state, the first mandate to do so in
1932.199
Modern Iraq emerged as an independent kingdom, its boundaries and major
institutions defined while it was a mandate under British tutelage. The Sunni military in
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Iraq, would come to lead the Arab world’s first military coup d’etat. During the 1950s,
the strong and pro-Western prime minister, Nuri al-Said, linked Iraq with the West in the
Baghdad Pact200 as part of an anti-communist allegiance. It was the sole Arab country to
join, and it went against the Nasserist Arabism sweeping the Middle East and the brewing
Iraqi nationalism that sought to resist Western ties. Iraqis saw the monarchy as a puppet
of the British, part of the boiling politics leading up to the military “Free Officers” coup
d’état in July 1958. Coup members, led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim, were inspired
by the coup in Egypt. They murdered the young King Faysal II and his closest advisers
(including Nuri al-Said) and established a the Republic of Iraq. Born from centuries of
oppression from foreign control, the republic experienced a violent national renewal.201
Emerging Women’s Movement
The Iraqi Shia and Sunni uluma (Muslim legal scholars) were against the
codification of personal status because it encroached on their authority and transferred
family matters to state courts and its civil servants. Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim
was a long-time opponent of the codification of personal status laws during the
Hashemite period.202 In 1910, the famous Iraqi poet Jamil Sidky Zahawi published an
article in the Egyptian journal Al-Moayed, later republished in the Iraqi journal Tanweer
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al-Afkar, about liberating women from social custom.203 The first women’s magazine in
Iraq, Layla (est. 1923), “disseminated news about culture, education, and family affairs,
as well as led a campaign for the liberation of women.”204 Other women activists
believed that polygamy was waning and so legislation was unnecessary. Asma al-Zahawi,
president of the first women’s organization in Iraq, the Women’s Awakening Club (Nadi
al-Nahda al-Nisa’iyya), expressed in the 1920s how unacceptable polygamy had become
among upper-class women. However, opposition to polygamy was echoed again in the
mid-1950s. Naziha al-Dulaymi, co-founder and the first president of the Iraqi Women
League and minister of municipalities in Iraq’s government (1959-1962), criticized the
use of polygamy as a means of augmenting the wealth or perceived wealth of the
husband. In the “feudal class” multiple wives were seen as an example of a sheikh’s
wealth, and in the “peasant class,” more women meant more means of production
through children or labor.205
With the fall of the Hashemite monarchy, religious rituals suffered. “The
Communists and the nationalists were powerful in the government and on the streets,”
recalls a Najaf (Shi’ite) cleric, “They got a tremendous boost from the support they were
getting from Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser.” Grand Ayatollah Muhsin alHakim ascended the cleric’s political party, the al-Dawa, or the call, which consisted
mostly of men under age thirty-five concerned about the rise of communism and state
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nationalism206 –and ultimately a competing power hierarchy. When the Personal Status
Law No. 188 was introduced, it was a year and a half after the 1958 coup that overthrew
the monarchy. The Personal Status Law No. 188 (1959) broke partially from shari’a law
by introducing laws that granted equal inheritance and divorce rights, relegated divorce,
inheritance and marriage to civil, instead of religious, courts, and provided for child
support. Shari’a could adjudicate cases that the 1959 law did not cover but more
importantly, it legitimized women’s participation in the legislative process concerning
family matters.207, 208 It provided a clear text for judges trained and appointed by the state
to rule on all matters of personal status.
Iraqi Personal Status Law No. 188 (1959)
The 1959 Personal Status Law No. 188209 marked a longstanding struggle
between the religious establishment, both Sunni and Shi’ite clerics, and the secular
government over who should adjudicate personal status laws. The 1959 law was one of
the most protective laws for women’s rights, stating that the legal age for both men and
women should be at least 18,210 polygamy is prohibited, a Muslim male can marry a nonMuslim female without restrictions or conditions, and a woman can disobey her husband
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if he is an inadequate husband for financial or interpersonal reasons.211 It was also drawn
from both Hanafi (sunni) and Jafari (shi’ite) interpretations of the Shari’a,212 indicating
some compromises in ideology were made to create a unified nation-state laws that could
adequately adjudicate personal status. The matters covered in the 1959 Personal Status
Law include engagement and marriage;213 unlawful weddings and marriage with
followers of monotheistic religions;214 marital rights and obligation;215 dissolution of
marriage;216 waiting periods between divorce and remarriage;217 birth and its
consequences;218 wills and guardianship;219 and inheritance.220,
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established by the 1959 Personal Status Law (PSL).222 Below is a summary of the 1959
personal status law on marriage, financial matters, divorce, guardianship, and inheritance.
Iraqi Personal Status Law No. 188 (1959): Marriage
Article 8 gives a judge discretion to permit marriage between men and women
who are older than 15 years but younger than 18 years of age, so long as the man is
physically capable and has his legal guardian’s approval, which will be re-requested if
there is initially disapproval. If the guardian approves or fails to give an unreasonable
rejection, the judge has the authority to approve the union. Marriages must be in the
official registry. The state is able to monitor and undermine unofficial religious and
ethnic leaders by requiring registration with the state and age restrictions for the marriage
to be valid. Under Article 9(1), forced marriages, lacking consent, are void if no
consummation has occurred. A marriage cannot be prevented by a relative. If the relative
is of 1st-degree, then the violator is subject to a 3-year imprisonment. If the violator is a
distant relative, then he or she is subject to 10 years imprisonment.223 Article 3(4)
prohibits marriage with more than one wife without judicial permission if the husband is
financially insufficient to have more than one wife. Article 26 adds that he must have the
first wife’s approval to house another wife or another relative, excluding minor children,
which would otherwise not be the case. The punishment for not complying is one year
imprisonment and/or a fine of 100 Dinars.224
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However, RCC Order Number 189, enacted in 1980 in response to the impact of
the Iraq-Iran war leaving wives as widows, allowed men to take a second wife without
any other legal requirements and if she was a widow prior, indicating a breakdown in the
law’s progressive nature to secure better familial stability in the face of national and
international instability. Article 17 states that a Muslim man may marry a Christian or
Jew (People of the Book), but a Muslim female may not marry a non-Muslim.225 This is
customary.
Iraqi Personal Status Law No. 188 (1959): Financial Matters
Article 31 states that a judge can determine an enforceable marital alimony paid
by the husband and the wife may file a marital alimony case with the court if the
agreement is not fulfilled. This covers clothing, food, housing, basic medication, and the
cost of servants. Article 24(1) states that a husband must provide these things even if she
has her own income or lives in another home with his consent. Article 25(1)(a) states that
a wife loses entitlement to the stipend if she leaves the home without his permission;
refuses to travel or move with her husband; or if she is convicted or imprisoned for any
reason.226 Article 29 states that if the wife must borrow money to cover the expenses,
then the husband must repay the debt incurred by the wife. Attempting to keep the
husband accountable for his financial dues to his wife is a regulation of a religious
tradition. Article 50 states that alimony continues only three months after terminating
marriage, which is also the “waiting period” in which she must not remarry. Article 59
states that children are entitled to child support when in the custody of their mother, even
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if she is not being provided for financially. The girl-child may receive support until
marriage and the boy until he is able to earn his own living.227 These Articles are in line
with religious tradition while holding men accountable for their family financially.
Iraqi Personal Status Law No. 188 (1959): Divorce
Men and women do not have the equal right to initiate and obtain a divorce in
Iraq. Article 34 defines divorce as the “termination of marriage by the husband or whom
he assigns or by the wife if she assigns to do so or by the Judge.” Article 39 defines the
three different types of divorce: Talaq or unilateral divorce by the husband; judicial
divorce by the court; and voluntary divorce for the wife if allowable under the marriage
contract. A divorce is only valid when it is registered in court. The authority of the state
legitimizes marriage and its termination. Article 40 states that if a man divorces his wife
without reason, he will need to provide compensation. The Article defines appropriate
reasons for divorce.
For either party, it is permissible to request divorce based on harm that makes
marriage impossible; marital infidelity; if the marriage was not contracted with judicial
permission prior to both parties attaining 18 years of age; if marriage was concluded
outside the court through coercion and was not consummated; or if the husband enters a
polygamous marriage without judicial permission. This was a progressive change
compared to traditional practices, which hardly allow women the right to divorce, likely
in part because the contract was made between the groom and the bride’s guardian. The
law gives women much more autonomy in their marriage and its termination. If there is
personal discord, reconciliation procedures are taken, and if those fail, and the husband
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refuses to pronounce talaq, judicial divorce is granted. If the wife is at fault, her financial
rights are forfeited.228
The reasons a wife may divorce her husband are extensive. The wife may request
judicial divorce if the husband is imprisoned for three or more years; if he abandons the
wife for two or more years without lawful reason; if he does not consummate marriage
within two years of contract; if the husband becomes impotent, afflicted with an illness
that harms her or if he is infertile and there has not been a son by him; if he fails to pay
maintenance after 60 days, or due to absence, disappearance, concealing his whereabouts,
or because of imprisonment for more than one year; if the husband refuses to pay
maintenance after the 60-day grace period; or if they have not consummated the marriage
and she would like to return her dowry and any of the husband’s proven expenditure for
the marriage.229 These are some of the most liberal laws on divorce for women in the
Arab world.
After the Iran-Iraq war began, the government reeled back national progress in
women’s rights. In 1981, RCC Order 474 awarded civilians 4,000 dinars and military
personnel 8,000 dinars if they divorced their wives of Iranian origin.230
Iraqi Personal Status Law No. 188 (1959): Guardianship
A divorced wife may have custody of her children until they reach 10 years of
age. The Court may determine if she retains custody until 15 years of age, at which point
the child may choose where he or she lives. If the mother has custody, the father must
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pay custodial alimony. Article 57(2) states that a wife may keep custody of her children
even if she remarries, which is a very progressive compared to personal status laws that
say the wife forfeits custody if she remarries, like in Jordan.231
Iraqi Personal Status Law No. 188 (1959): Inheritance
Inheritance in Iraq was governed by shari’a law prior to 1959. While it accords
men and women shares, the largest often go to patrilineal relatives of the deceased. The
original 1959 Code departs from shari’a by providing for equal inheritance between sons
and daughters. Article 89 of the 1963 amendments gives greater specificity and Article 90
prioritizes principles in shari’a before the 1959 Code to determine the distribution. In
1969, the law was changed and made less equitable to appease traditional factions since
the coup.232
The new law notably changed the Islamic laws of inheritance and accorded
women and men equal shares.
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The law did not ban polygamy outright but set

limitations. Article 3, Section 4 provided that marriage with more than one wife needed
the permission of a judge, which would only be granted on two conditions: first, that the
husband was financially competent to support more than one wife (4a); second, that there
was some "lawful benefit involved" (4b). Section 5 added if the husband's ability to treat
his wives equally was in question, polygamy should not be permitted. The matter
remained at the discretion of the judge. Section 6 punished polygamous marriages that go
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against Section 4 and 5 with imprisonment of less than a year, a fine of less than 100
dinars, or both.235
The development of the 1959 Personal Status Law leaped from the critical
juncture of a violent entrance into nationhood and a strong Arab nationalist movement
that included women’s activism. All of the political elements surrounding the late 1950s
were essential to the law’s formation. However, the RCC reforms prove that war and
political instability can cut social progress.
A Political Environment of Change
General ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim wanted “to ensure women their legal rights and
family independence.” But it was also a result of women activists voicing their demands
and participating in the legislative process of Arab Nationalism. The head of the League
for the Defense of Women’s Rights, Naziha al-Dulaymi, then Minister of Municipalities
and the first woman cabinet member in the Arab world, was among the specialists, jurists
and ulama who prepared the personal status law.236 Interviews with then senior members
of the League, Mubejel Baban and Bushra Perto, reveal that it was because of their
efforts that the reform which gave men and women equal shares in inheritance was fully
realized in the Personal Status Law No. 188.237
Naziha al-Dulaymi was also leader of the League for the Defense of Women's
Rights. She criticized marital customs in Iraq as a member of the Communist Party,
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claiming that women of "the peasant class" were treated as means of income for their
fathers and reproduction for their husbands. At an early age, girls worked for their
fathers, who later hoped to profit further from their daughters' muhur (plural of mahr), or
the mandatory payments made by the groom, as soon as they reach puberty. Women were
traded for livestock or other women, and child marriages were more prevalent in years of
drought and grave economic need. Fathers would offer their daughters at a very young
age for paltry sums or even without a mahr if they could not support them or to pay a
debt. Women were traded as compensation for murder, theft, humiliation, and as debt
payment. Prior to the 1958 coup, in the context of brewing political discontent, AlDulaymi and women lawyers, such as Na'ima al-Wakil, publicly voiced the oppression of
women as a matter that transcended class; all women were treated as a commodity and
with no say in the matter of their marriage.238
Law No. 188 responded to many of the concerns about marriage raised by
women. It required a woman's consent to marriage (Articles 4 and 6) and emphasized her
entitlement to a mahr (Articles 19-22). Three articles sought to discourage child
marriage. Article 7(1) stipulated that sanity and puberty were essential to the capacity to
marry; Article 8 stated that capacity to marry was complete on the attainment of the age
of 18; and according to Article 9, "If a boy or girl who is approaching majority, claims,
after reaching the age of 16, that he or she has attained puberty and requests permission
to marry, the judge may grant this if he is satisfied and after seeking the legal guardian’s
consent but it is not required.”239 These provisions were an attempt to make marriage a
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consensual bond between two adults rather than a commodification of the daughter by the
father and society. The law tried to eliminate child marriage contracted by guardians
permitted under the Hanafi & Shafi'i schools of jurisprudence. Law No. 188 further
diminished the guardians' power by vesting a state-employed judge with the power to
marry young couples against the guardians' wishes.240 The powers that previously resided
with fathers, guardians, and husbands was redistributed to the woman and potential bride
and the nation-state. At least, that was the idea. However, in practice, by referring to the
capacity to marry in various articles, the law was open to different interpretations. It also
did not directly address and condemn the issue of forced marriages.
The military coup in February 1963 was largely seen as “anti-Shia” because the
Iraqi army and security services were Sunni-dominated, a tradition that goes back to the
Ottoman Empire. Iraq came under the rule of the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party run by an
elite mainly from the northern Sunni town of Takrit.241 Sunnis were a well-connected
network, including Saddam Hussein. Arab nationalism was built into the political scene
to remain competitive economically and politically with Egypt.242
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Ba'athist and Arab nationalist perpetrators promptly amended the Personal Status
Law (1959), introducing changes regarding polygamy and repealing the provisions
applicable to inheritance, replacing them with rules more compatible with shari’a to
appease conservative factions of society.243,244, 245 In 1968, the Ba’ath party seized control
once more. Iraqi nationalism became just as important as ever. The authority mainly lay
with President Hassan al-Bakr and his cousin Saddam Hussein, vice chairman of the
Revolution Command Council (RCC). The mostly Sunni Ba’ath party created a tight
network of loyal men in the military and polices while also creating a network among
tribes and political parties.246 The Ba’ath party harnessed female labor to consolidate its
authority and achieve rapid economic growth, mostly in the industrial and service sectors,
despite labor shortages.247 The government dismantled and reassembled civil societies
after its seizure of power. It incentivized women with labor and employment laws,
including gender equity in education, civil service jobs, equal pay and equal work, etc.
Women’s labor continued to be in high demand in the onset of the Iran-Iraq war (19801988).
The Iraqi Provisional Constitution (drafted in 1970) guaranteed equal rights to
women and other laws specifically ensured their right to vote, attend school, run for
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political office, and own property. Saddam Hussein even passed an interim constitution
that solidified formal equality for women with a non-discrimination clause.248,

249

Iraq

ratified both the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which safeguard equal protection under
international law to all, on January 25, 1971.250 In the early 1970s, the Ba’athist party
created a loyal nation-state. The Ba’ath party established the General Federation of Iraqi
Women (GFIW) in 1972 to implement state policy and create a vehicle for women’s
rights. The GFIW established community centers, job-training, and other social programs
with a generous budget and especially in collaboration with trade unions. The GFIW’s
goals were nationalist, socialist, and sought gender equality.251 The hierarchal
organization of cadres were obedient to authority,252 sang their love and admiration of
Saddam Hussein, and in return for their loyalty to the state, female citizens in the GFIW
had political power. Many state-controlled agencies directed toward women also sought
to re-socialize them into ‘new Iraqi women’ with political education.253 Women who
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advocated against the policies of the regime were often harassed and punished, including
rape, torture, and public beheadings.254
Members of GFIW presented a draft of family law reforms to the regime in
1975.255 The 1959 law was seen as incomplete and insufficient to women activists and
then it was diminished and left contested by the 1963 coup. In 1976, Budur Zaki, a
lawyer, published an extensive article in the Communist-oriented al-Thaqafa al-Jadida,
or “The New Culture,” discussing shortcomings of the 1959 law. She pointed out that in
Article 7, which established the need for "sanity and puberty" as prerequisites for
marriage, age was not mentioned and puberty was left to interpretation. She
recommended punishment for forcing women to marry; increasing in severity if the
marriage were shighar (exchange marriages, where one woman serves as another’s mahr)
or part of fasal (settlement for a tribal dispute). Women lawyers were aware that by
referring to the capacity to marry in separate articles, one requiring but not defining
maturity, the law had created a loophole which enabled judges to continue marrying
minors. For peasant girls, as pointed out in the mid-1970s, this could have meant
marriage at a much lower age than 16.256 Zaki also criticized marriage by proxy, noting
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the drawbacks resulting from control by fathers and other legal guardians.257 Women
activists were not silent, and were in fact emboldened by the creation of GFIW.
In the mid-1970s, when an amendment to the Personal Status Law was again
discussed, women associated with the Communist party were more outspoken. They
opposed Article 3(5), which empowered a judge to ascertain whether wives would be
treated equally, for two reasons: that a judge was ill-equipped to make such a decision;
and, on the basis that equal treatment was, in practice, an impossibility, citing the
Qur’anic verse, "Ye will not be able to deal equally between [your] wives, however much
you wish [to do so]."258 They further argued that polygamy contradicted the notion of
modern marriage, offended a woman's dignity and created a multitude of problems.
Members of GFIW pushed for far-reaching reforms in a new law and some
favored the secularization of the law.259 The 1978 amendment responded to many of the
criticisms raised by women. An example being that it gave mothers in the case of divorce
custody of her children until the age of 10 (previously 7 for boys and 9 for girls).260
However, the minimum age of marriage for women was lowered from 16 to 15. The
judge now had discretion to grant permission to 15-year- olds to marry, even against their
guardians' wishes. The amendment also permitted divorce by judicial proceedings even if
the marriage took place before the attainment of 18 years of age without the approval of a
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judge.261 Women associated with the Ba’athist and Communist parties, welcomed the
clarification of age but recognized the mixed legal agenda.262
The Ba’athist women condemned the lowering of the minimum age, but the
Communist women tried to rationalize the legal change. Lawyer Layla Husayn Ma'ruf,
head of the GFIW's Secretariat for Legal Affairs, explained that lowering the legal age
for marriage was intended to address the reality of early marriages, especially in rural
areas. It would encourage marriages at the age of 15 within the courts while discouraging
marriages at the age of 9 to 11 outside of the court. Nonetheless, she emphasized that this
should be seen as an exception to the rule, as most 15-year-olds were not ready to
shoulder familial responsibilities.263 While GFIW leaders might have preferred the
secularization of personal status laws, the merging of Sunni and Shi’a laws allowed them
to maneuver around clerics with singular authority.264 Clerics and religious leaders were
rendered less powerful in the face of state forces. The Ba’ath continued to carefully
weigh their political players, growing concerned mainly for the loyalty of religious
conservatives.
Nasrin Nuri, who participated in al-Thaqafa al-Jadida's symposium to discuss the
1978 amendment, strongly opposed the lowering of the minimum age. She said that early
marriages created socially and economically unstable families that are insufficiently able
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to provide for children.265 Budur Zaki, a lawyer, knew that in practice judges did not find
the permission to marry at the age of 15 reserved for exceptional cases only.
The 1978 amendment also nullified forced marriages but only if they were not
consummated, and permitted divorce cases where they had been consummated. The
amendment also punished the prevention of marriage. Members of the GFIW explained
that the new provisions eliminated “outdated social customs which were the legacy of
imperialism and reaction.”266 The amendment applied to shighar marriage, fasal marriage
and ordinary forced marriage. It also sought to punish al-nahwa, or the right of a cousin
to forbid marriage of a female relative, and other family interventions.267 The laws
emerging sought to replace informal tribal authority with the authority of the state.
Women supported this because the state seemed to have a more egalitarian view of their
role in society. Women associated with the Communist party also welcomed these
changes. Su'ad Khayri and Nasrin Nuri, who participated in al-Thaqafa al-Jadida's
symposium on the 1978 amendment, pointed out that the law should have also forbidden
forcible marriages and hold accomplices responsible. These demands for more complete
and protective laws, however, were never met.268
Late 20th Century Politics
During the 1980s and 1990s, minor amendments continued to be introduced, but
only the Ba'athist-supported GFIW was able to exert limited influence. Women were
265

Al-Thaqafa al-Jadida 108 (August 1978), 11, 14, in Noga Efrati.

266

Al-Thawra, February 14, (1978), 7, in Noga Efrati.

267

Article 2, Personal Status Law of 1978.

268

Noga Efrati.

85

given the right to vote and represent Iraqis in the National Assembly and local
government in 1980.269 In 1986, Iraq signed the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).270 The al-Anfal Campaign (19861989) was brewing at the same time, as part of the greater political backdrop of the IraqiKurdish conflict since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. It was an explicit campaign of
systematic genocide against the Kurdish population in northern Iraq and other minority
communities. Both women and men were jailed, tortured, raped and murdered as part of
the genocide and the growing tyrannical Ba’athist government.271 In 1987, an amendment
to Law No. 188 restricted judicial permission for the marriages of 15-year-olds only if
they found a compelling need for it.272 By the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, men
returning to a faltering economy led to a swelling support for patriarchal and conservative
values, weighing the most on rural and impoverished women.273 The laws began to lack
authority in the face of traditional practices and economic hardship. The interim
Constitution of 1990 included an equal protection clause, like the 1970 interim
Constitution, but it was soon nullified by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).274
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Since the 1991 Gulf War, the position of women in Iraqi society deteriorated
rapidly, as women and girls were disproportionately affected by the economic
consequences of the United Nations sanctions, compounded by legal restrictions on
mobility and equal access to employment.275 The “faith campaign” in 1991 sought to
regain legitimacy after the defeat in the Kuwait War by allying itself with tribal forces
and fundamentalist religious groups, which wanted greater autonomy in their society.
Previous support for women’s rights went against the nature of patriarchal authority in
the tribal structure and the religious beliefs of fundamentalist groups.276 Hussein publicly
embraced Islam’s moral authority, changing the progress of personal status laws in the
process. Honor killings increased and the consequential prison sentence for male
perpetrators was reduced from 8 years to no more than 6 months, which even then was
rarely imposed. After the Gulf War, U.S. President George W. Bush urged the Kurds and
Shi’a to fight the Ba’athists. The government killed many of women and children in
response to potential antagonism. By 2000, a militia funded by Hussein’s son Uday, was
beheading women in a campaign against prostitution.277 The country spiraled from
having one of the best health systems in the Middle East to a tripled maternal mortality
rate and 60% of the population dependent on the Oil-for-Food program. Women could
not find work. Polygamy rates increased rapidly.278 The nation-state that had once put

275

Human Rights Watch Report (2003).

276

Ali Mamouri.

277

Marjorie P. Lasky.

278

Ibid.

87

forth one of the most progressive personal status laws under a nationalistic state became a
horror house for torture and abuse under a totalitarian regime.
How Did We Get Here?
The women’s movement, an important part of the Arab nationalism movement,
sought further reforms after the Personal Status Law of 1959. Other laws were passed but
their gravity seemed centered elsewhere, on more conservative factions of Iraqi society.
Iraq’s aspiration to be an Arab power-house depended on adequate economic
development, which drove the labor reforms that allowed women to work. Women’s
rights and a strong nation-state seemed in-step. The Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War
caused the nation-state to fall in sync with more tribal and patriarchal demands. The
“faith campaign” in response to the defeat in the Kuwait War is an example. Just prior,
the RCC reeled back the originally progressive nature of the 1959 law. The Iraqi
government also co-opted the women’s movement in the GFIW, ensuring control over
domestic matters as international affairs went haywire. Sanctions and defeat stewed the
societal fabric of Iraq, creating a perfect environment to fall back on old frameworks of
patriarchy. In the faith campaign Hussein publicly embraced Islam’s moral authority,
aligning the state framework with the religious framework when the state was weak. The
two frameworks aligned to create a patriarchal matrix that used the subjugation of women
to cope with dire circumstances.
The Recent Decade
When Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party fell after the invasion of U.S.-led
forces, the U.S. established the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA) with
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as its administer. In July 2003, Ambassador Bremer
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appointed three women to the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). In September
2003, Dr. Aqila Al Hashimi, one of the women appointed, was assassinated.279 On
December 29, 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) passed Resolution 137 abolishing
Iraq’s lenient and non-sectarian Personal Status Law. The Resolution states that ‘the
provisions of Islamic Shari’a shall be applied in areas of marriage, engagement… marital
rights, waiting periods, parentage, breastfeeding, custody, child support, kin support,
parents’ support, will, willing, holding of estate, and all Religious Courts in accordance
with the mandates of their Sect.’280 It was fiercely fought against by activists and
repealed two months later. The law would essentially hand over personal status
adjudication to religious authority, like Jordan and the Ottoman court system it has
modeled itself after. The proposed-Article 41 states that “Iraqis are free in their
commitment to their personal status according to their religion, sects, beliefs, or choices,
and this shall be regulated by law.”281 The law does not explicitly safeguard the previous
Personal Status Law as an option, but rather it communalizes the issue of personal status
while appeasing religious courts.
As El-Karama, a coalition organization to end violence against women and
promote equality in the Middle East and North Africa, states: “This Article will allow
individuals to claim on legal grounds that sectarian religious laws can supersede
obedience to the laws of the state [by placing] women’s rights at the mercy of the
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interpretations by the religious leaders and not the law or elected leaders.”282 Opponents
argue that it conflicts with Article 14, which states that “Iraqis are equal before the law
without discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, origin, color,
religion, sect, belief or opinion, or economic or social status.” Article 41 would enable
religious communities to violate Article 14 in the case of personal status because it will
be “according to their religion.” It would essentially replace government authority with
religious authority, harkening back to the British mandate and the Ottoman Empire. It is
also no coincidence that Resolution 137, abolishing the 1959 Personal Status Law, was
passed under ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim, a Shi’ite cleric who headed the Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. He is also the son of the Grand Ayatulla Muhsin alHakim that adamantly opposed codification during the Hashemite period.
By May 2004, Ambassador Bremer selected an Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) to
oversee the administration and elections for the Transitional National Assembly (TNA).
Operation Iraqi Freedom, overthrowing Saddam Hussein and seeking to de-Ba’athify
Iraq, left a vacuum of power that was symbolically filled by the interim government on
June 1, 2004 with the handover taking place on June 28, 2004, and a series of transitional
bodies like the National Assembly.283 The law of the land during the invasion was the
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The TAL’s equal-protection clause, Article 12,
provides for equality and Article 1(b) mandates that the protection applies equally to both
men and women. However, women were excluded from the drafting of TAL, and women
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were greatly underrepresented at all levels of government under the IIG. The surfacelevel legal changes failed to dismantle the previous legal tradition or reinforce the 1959
personal status law. In the January 2005 elections, most women were politically
conservative while independent and reform-based politics of other women were
excluded.284 Grand Ayatullah Ali Sistani, the leading Shiite Muslim authority in Iraq who
often prefers to remain neutral in party politics,285 insisted that the 2005 constitution
stipulates that Iraqis are free to live by their own rules of personal status so that the
Shi’ites could follow their belief system.286 Ayatollah Sistani issued a Fatwa seeming to
encourage women to participate in the 2005 elections.287
During legal developments following the Iraq War, Islamic political parties
“demand[ed]… a more shari’a-based law of personal status,” likely as a way to prove
their cultural authenticity more than to develop policy. The personal status law remained
“precisely as it was in Saddamist Iraq.”288 The Shi’ite Islamist forces, namely the United
Iraqi Alliance (UIA), had been particularly obsessed with personal status. They cited
Article 41, a useful legislative mechanism, as saying that Iraqis have the “freedom” to
live by their own rules of personal status. However, little was done to push a policy
agenda. Creating a separate court system based on religious identity would be divisive
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among Muslims and other communities. The fact is that the 1959 personal status law,
with its revisions, still politically appeased all parties.289 The secularists did not want
complete Islamization; the Sunni nationalists still had their unified law of the state; and
the Kurds did not support the separate laws for each sect, viewing it as a Balkanization of
Iraq into discrete communities.290 The 1959 law provides a true alternative to merely
delegated personal status to their respective communities, as has been
In October 2013, the Iraqi Justice Ministry sent a draft law on Shi’ite (Ja’fari)
personal status to the cabinet for approval and referral to the parliament. The law
reinstated cases of personal status as adjudicated according to Shi’ite jurisprudence or the
respective religious community. The Shi’ite majority claims that this legislation reinstates
their beliefs, rendered powerless in the face of the previous republic’s legislation. The
proposed Shi’ite law could be legal under Article 41 but not in Article 14, giving greater
authority to clerics and religious communities in the long-standing conflict between
adjudication of personal status among the state authority or the religious authority. Grand
Ayatollah Muhammad al-Ya’qubi, head of the Islamic Virtue Party (est. 2003), opposes a
democracy that establishes legislation against God’s Islamic law291 and therefore
supported Article 41.292 However, Shi’ite jurist authorities themselves have been critical
of the poorly written law that had been “cobbled together hastily… merely to burnish
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Islamist credentials rather than actually pass meaningful legislation.”293 Conservative
Iraqi lawmaker Susan al-Saad says, “It is a divine Shari’a, it is a must.”294
Among the many issues in the law is the matter of defining the onset of puberty as
a determinant of adulthood. As Associate Professor Haider Ala Hamoudi at the
University of Pittsburg School of Law explains, “It obligates a judge to actually attempt
to determine whether or not a fourteen year old boy is able to bequeath property based on
whether he has ever had a wet dream or has public hair, without offering anything by way
of procedure or evidentiary rules…” Ultimately, the law, by defining Shi’ite marriage
rules in a selectively specific way, “deviates more from those rules (Qur’anic) than the
existing [Personal Status Law] does.”295
Challenges to the 1959 Personal Status Law reinforce the development path it was
borne from: debates on personal status have a place of deliberation in the civic sphere
because it was given a place by the 1959 law. If the law was never created it is hard to
see that Iraq would have ever deviated from the adjudication of personal status as it was
laid out by the Ottoman Empire and medieval Islamic jurisprudence. Instead, there is
pressure to have a nationalized, state-led personal status law, especially among Sunni
nationalists. The permanence of the 1959 Personal Status Law in the framework of
personal status in Iraq is proven by the difficulty that Shi’a political groups have in
making substantial policy change.
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De Facto
The debate over personal status law among Shi’ite authorities and other social and
political groups demonstrates a competing understanding of democracy, the role of Islam,
and national unity in the context of the family domain. The communalization of personal
status law would likely disintegrate the potential for unity among the various identities
that make up the state of Iraq.296 Today, exposure to assassinations and kidnappings is a
significant factor in limiting women’s participation in political life and civil society
activism.297
In a study conducted by the American Bar Association: Iraq Legal Development
Project, one woman interviewed said that parties in shari’a they have “the same right[s]but in reality, it varies from one area to another, from the city to the countryside, due to
the culture of the region in which the woman lives.” No legal mechanisms specifically
enforced the more progressive laws for women. Also, the actual age minimum of
marriage depends on the judge and the school of jurisprudence employed. Many in the
same survey said that most enter marriage at a younger age and some have been known to
marry at age nine. When it comes to prohibiting marriage, a male cousin may do so on
the part of his female cousin (al-nahi).298 Other practices include a contractual agreement
in which the bride’s brother must marry the groom’s sister (al-kassah marriage) and a
woman can be offered as a bride from one tribe to another as a means of solving a
problem between the two tribes (al-fasel marriage). Women can also be bought for mut’a
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(pleasure marriage) in which a “wife” is paid for the “marriage” in a certain timeframe,
which were rarer before the fall of Saddam Hussein. Girls can be reserved, bought, and
sold among relatives or others. These customs are more common in rural areas and tribes
in urban areas.299 Furthermore, the termination of forced marriage expends a significant
amount of time, money, and energy and many women, even if they were forced to marry,
are not aware of their right to terminate a marriage. Men initiated divorces after the fall of
Saddam Hussein, often without the presence and/or knowledge of their wives.300
Husbands can pay alimony in installments as low as 10 Iraqi Dinars per month.
Polygamy is easy to accomplish, rightful inheritance and custody is easy to withhold due
to ignorance of the law, custom, and shame. Corruption in family courts often make it
easier for a husband in many cases and women are discouraged to go to court by their
relatives and communities.301
In practice, the Personal Status Law of 1959 does little to safeguard the wellbeing of women today, after several wars and a disparaging economy. The state devolved
after the Gulf War and rather than governing by the rule of law, violence dictated order.
State stability remains in question after the American-led War in Iraq. The Personal
Status Law of 1959 seems like a relic of past politics. The law remains a critical juncture
in the development of personal status law, however, because the personal status law and
women’s rights remains in the civic sphere of government and national political identity.
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No substantial counter-policy to the Personal Status Law of 1959 has been achieved to
date. The law set a precedent of judicial governance.
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CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I have used historical institutional analysis to trace the patriarchal
framework that makes up personal status law in Jordan and Iraq. The critical juncture in
the development of personal status law in both Iraq and Jordan occurred in their
tumultuous entrance into nationhood. The outcomes of the two critical junctures were,
however, different. For Jordan, the critical juncture left Jordanians with the 1952 Courts
Law, and for Iraqis, the 1959 Personal Status Law. The 1952 Courts Law reinforced the
previous millet court system. The 1959 Personal Status Law, however, challenged the
authority of the shari’a court by creation a national law of personal status that was more
progressive. Jordan’s critical juncture reinforced the past institution of personals status
law. Iraq’s critical juncture created a new framework that was more progressive and gave
more authority to its government.
Change in the Middle East stems from politically tumultuous times, and even
though many would classify the protests and riots throughout the Middle East following
2011 as ‘tumultuous,’ it remains too early to tell whether women’s rights and the laws
that define them will be positively or negatively affected.
It is clear, however, that responses in a critical juncture affect the path of
institutional development. In the case of Jordan, a monarchy weighed its costs and
benefits and thought that it would be best to stick with what works: a separate shari’a
court system for matters of personal status. The Jordanian state still influences the court
through the appointment of judges and the Personal Status Law it created in 1976. The
Jordanian state aligned its power framework that includes personal status lawn with the
traditional power framework of the patriarchal tribal customs and Islamic jurisprudence.
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It is clear that any change in the state’s laws on personal status will have to come from
within the government or monarchy. It will be a calculated decision.
In the case of Iraq, a monarchy was overthrown by the army, dominated by Sunni,
who were inspired by the Arab Nationalism movement in Egypt. The coup inspired the
new leaders to consider a wide range of options for their independent state. They
deviated from the previous path of personal status and created a more progressive law in
1959 that also put more authority in the hands of the government. The women’s
movement worked in tandem with the Arab Nationalism movement and mobilized.
However, by the third coup in 1968, the Revolutionary Command Council and the coup’s
leaders changed previously progressive personal status law to placate conservative
populations. Ambitious wars ultimately cost Iraq, and as a consequence, the progressive
policies were reeled back or thrown out altogether. Iraq has been marked with violence,
despite its progress 1959 personal status law. The politics that dictated the law and its
changes were external. The women’s rights movement began as an organic part of the
Arab Nationalism movement and became a controlled arm of Saddam Hussein’s
government. Changes in the personal status law of Iraq are indicative of the state’s
political environment. With the 1959 law and then the devolvement into chaos, Iraq
created a spectrum to swing between: from a nationalistic fervor to chaos.
Both countries have a chaotic system of de facto concerning women’s rights. In a
recent ranking of women’s rights in the Middle East, Iraq was second to last, with a
“penal code [allowing] men who kill their wives to serve a maximum of three years in
prison rather than a life sentence.” Jordan ranks fourth but second to last in the category
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of honor killings.302 The report provides short facts that help the reader understand why
each country earned the ranking that they did. They do not, however, provide the kind of
historical background necessary to tell the narrative of a nation-state and its potential for
change in women’s rights. In this historical analysis of the institution of personal status
law, its jurisprudential thought, politics, and legal body, I hope to have provided a wider
narrative than the surveys and rankings every year can allow.
Limitations
This analysis certainly has its limitations. Original research was not conducted.
Fresh, up-to-date information is not in this research but nor was it the objective. The wide
net of information covered may have also left some parts of history rather shallow. This
was not an analysis of depth, but rather breadth. Certainly an in-depth examination of the
critical juncture defined in this research would create a worthwhile piece. The twocountry case study may also create a false binary, rather than a spectrum of outcomes in
the realm of personals status. The incorporation of institutional theory, history, politics,
and some patriarchal theory is certainly an endeavor that could more adequately be
expanded.
Recommendations
I recommend a different set of countries for analysis in order to provide a
spectrum of narratives on the historical institutional development of personals status law.
A shorter period of history would also allow for more in-depth examination and enrich
the research. Either realm of socio-political and historical research would enrich one’s
understanding of the Middle East.
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